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iABSTRACT
Post-silicon validation has become a critical stage in the system-on-chip (SoC) de-
velopment cycle, driven by increasing design complexity, higher level of integration
and decreasing time-to-market. According to recent reports, post-silicon valida-
tion eﬀort comprises more than 50% of the overall development eﬀort of an 65nm
SoC. Though post-silicon validation covers many aspects ranging from electronic
properties of hardware to performance and power consumption of whole systems,
a central task remains validating functional correctness of both hardware and its
integration with software. There are several key challenges to achieving accelerated
and low-cost post-silicon functional validation. First, there is only limited silicon
observability and controllability; second, there is no good test coverage estimation
over a silicon device; third, it is diﬃcult to generate good post-silicon tests before
a silicon device is available; fourth, there is no eﬀective software robustness testing
approaches to ensure the quality of hardware/software integration.
We propose a systematic approach to accelerating post-silicon functional vali-
dation with virtual prototypes. Post-silicon test coverage is estimated in the pre-
silicon stage by evaluating the test cases on the virtual prototypes. Such analysis is
ﬁrst conducted on the initial test suite assembled by the user and subsequently on
the expanded test suite which includes test cases that are automatically generated.
Based on the coverage statistics of the initial test suite on the virtual prototypes,
ii
test cases are automatically generated to improve the test coverage. In the post-
silicon stage, our approach supports coverage evaluation of test cases on silicon
devices to ensure ﬁdelity of early coverage evaluation. The generated test cases
are issued to silicon devices to detect inconsistencies between virtual prototypes
and silicon devices using conformance checking. We further extend the test case
generation framework to generate and inject fault scenario with virtual prototypes
for driver robustness testing. Besides virtual prototype-based fault injection, an
automatic driver fault injection approach is developed to support runtime fault
generation and injection for driver robustness testing. Since virtual prototype en-
ables early driver development, our automatic driver fault injection approach can
be applied to driver testing in both pre-silicon and post-silicon stages.
For preliminary evaluation, we have applied our coverage evaluation and test
generation to several network adapters and their virtual prototypes. We have
conducted coverage analysis for a suite of common tests on both the virtual pro-
totypes and silicon devices. The results show that our approach can estimate the
test coverage with high ﬁdelity. Based on the coverage estimation, we have em-
ployed our automatic test generation approach to generate additional tests. When
the generated test cases were issued to both virtual prototypes and silicon devices,
we observed signiﬁcant coverage improvement. And we detected 20 inconsisten-
cies between virtual prototypes and silicon devices, each of which reveals a virtual
prototype or silicon device defect. After we applied virtual prototype-based fault
injection approach to virtual prototypes for three widely-used network adapters,
we generated and injected thousands of fault scenarios and found 2 driver bugs. For
automatic driver fault injection, we have applied our approach to 12 widely-used
drivers. After testing all these drivers, we found 28 distinct bugs.
iii
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1.1 Motivation
New computer systems: smart phones, wearable devices, tablets, laptops, servers,
etc. are entering the market place at an ever-accelerating pace. This brings enor-
mous pressures on the product development teams to shorten the time-to-market.
A recent study by International Business Strategies indicates that a 3-month de-
lay to market reduces revenue by about 30% for chip manufacturers in general,
and the penalty is even more severe for fast-evolving markets such as mobile de-
vices [34]. To exacerbate the pressures, the complexities of these systems, both
their hardware and software, are increasing signiﬁcantly. Quoting a SoC archi-
tect for a mobile platform, “a state-of-the-art mobile platform is considered more
complex than a server due to the many types of technologies it integrates while
the product cycle is often as short as two years.” A crucial stage in the product
development cycle is post-silicon validation, i.e., validation conducted on actual
devices or silicon prototypes with corresponding drivers. Post-silicon validation is
a signiﬁcant, fastest-growing component of validation cost. According to recent
industry reports [59], post-silicon validation eﬀort often consumes more than 50%
of an 65nm SoC’s overall design eﬀort. This demands innovative approaches to
2speed-up post-silicon validation and reduce its cost.
Though post-silicon validation covers many aspects ranging from electronics
properties of hardware to performance and power consumption of whole systems,
a central task remains validating functional correctness of both hardware and its
integration with software. Recently virtual prototypes are increasingly used in
hardware/software development to enable driver development and validation at
an early stage even before silicon prototypes become available [70]. An example
is how Intel used virtual prototypes to enable driver development for their 40G
Ethernet adapter (E40G) before the silicon prototype became available [62]. An
E40G virtual prototype was created and used to test and validate the E40G driver
being developed. Bugs were found in the driver using the E40G virtual device, even
before the real E40G device became available. Since virtual prototypes are utilized
as a transaction-level replacement for silicon devices to support driver development
and validation, it is greatly desired to extend the eﬀectiveness of virtual prototypes
into post-silicon functional validation so that the major eﬀorts invested can be fully
utilized. We see major potentials of virtual prototypes in post-silicon functional
validation of both hardware and its integration with software.
1.1.2 Problem statement.
This dissertation research is concerned with how to speed-up post-silicon functional
validation with virtual prototypes for both hardware and software development.
We observe four major challenges to achieving our goal:
• Limited Silicon Observability and Traceability. The silicon device is typically
a black box. The amount of run-time information that can be retrieved from
the device internal with build-in test circuitries and advanced logic analyzers
3is still quite limited. Such limited observability and traceability make post-
silicon validation diﬃcult.
• Lack of Good Test Coverage Estimation. There lacks good test coverage met-
rics over a silicon device. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to assess the eﬀectiveness
of test cases and prioritize their application. In addition, coverage metrics
rooted in hardware design are not well suited for testing the integration with
software.
• Lack of Early Test Readiness. Test cases for post-silicon validation must
be ready before a silicon device is available. The time-to-market after the
device is ﬁrst available can be as short as several weeks. Therefore, it is
highly desired to avoid spending this precious time on preparing, debugging,
and ﬁxing test cases.
• Lack of Eﬀective Fault Injection for Driver Testing. Device drivers are critical
system components that operate or control devices. To ensure the system
reliability, device drivers must tolerate all kinds of system situations, such as
low resource situations, PCI bus errors and DMA failures. Therefore, it is
necessary that diﬀerent kinds of system scenarios and faults can be generated
and injected to test the driver robustness.
1.2 PROPOSED SOLUTION
We propose an approach to accelerating post-silicon functional validation and re-
ducing its cost with virtual prototypes. As shown in Figure 1.1, virtual prototypes
play a central role in our approach which mainly support three components:
• Coverage analysis: While a silicon device is often a black box, its correspond-
ing virtual prototype is a white box, i.e., its internal structures and workings
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Figure 1.1: Main Components of Our Approach
are visible. The virtual prototype often models transaction-level behaviors
of the silicon device. Therefore, the virtual prototype can be utilized to es-
timate the coverage of post-silicon validation tests on the functionalities of
the silicon device.
• Test generation: Based on the coverage estimation, test cases can be auto-
matically generated to speciﬁcally target silicon device functionalities that
are yet covered. Test cases are particularly needed to trigger error handling
conditions that are often hard to test with manually written tests. Expanded
test suite can be used for testing silicon devices and supporting conformance
checking.
• Eﬀective fault generation for driver testing: Since virtual prototypes provide
all device functionalities, many driver testing tasks can be conducted with
virtual prototypes. We ﬁrst develop a virtual prototype-based fault injection
for driver robustness testing. Furthermore, we develop an automatic driver
fault injection framework which can generate eﬀective fault scenarios in a
5modest amount of time. The automatic driver fault injection framework can
be applied to both virtual and silicon devices.
For coverage analysis and test generation, we employ symbolic execution of
virtual prototypes as the foundation. More details about these components are
elaborated below:
Symbolic Execution of Virtual Prototypes. The foundation of our approach
is symbolic execution of virtual prototypes [20], utilized in calculating test coverage
and generating new test cases. We have developed a symbolic execution environ-
ment (SEE) for QEMU virtual devices. Central to this environment is (1) how to
encapsulate a virtual device in an execution harness that is suﬃciently faithful to
avoid crippling inaccuracy and suﬃciently abstract to avoid prohibiting execution
overheads and (2) how to reign in several limitations of symbolic execution by
utilizing features of virtual devices.
Coverage Analysis of Post-silicon Tests. Test coverage is an important metric
for evaluating the quality and readiness of post-silicon tests. We propose an online-
capture oﬄine-replay approach to coverage analysis of post-silicon validation tests
with virtual prototypes for estimating silicon device test coverage [18]. We ﬁrst
capture necessary data from a concrete execution of the virtual prototype within
a virtual platform under a given test, and then compute the test coverage by
eﬃciently replaying this execution oﬄine on the virtual prototype itself. Our
approach provides early feedback on quality of post-silicon validation tests before
silicon is ready. To ensure ﬁdelity of early coverage evaluation, our approach have
been further extended to support coverage evaluation and conformance checking
in the post-silicon stage.
6Automatic Concolic Test Generation. We present a concolic testing approach
to generation of post-silicon tests with virtual prototypes [19]. This work is in-
spired by recent advances in concolic testing [30, 31]. Concolic (a portmanteau of
concrete and symbolic) testing is a hybrid testing technique that integrates con-
crete execution with symbolic execution [39]. In our approach, we ﬁrst identify
device states under test from concrete executions of a virtual prototype using a
transaction-based selection strategy, and then symbolically execute the virtual pro-
totype from these states. Concrete tests are generated based on the symbolic path
constraints obtained. We apply the generated test cases to both the silicon device
and the virtual prototype, and check for inconsistencies between the real and vir-
tual device states. Once an inconsistency is detected, we can replay the test case
on the virtual prototype through symbolic execution to see whether it is a silicon
device bug or a virtual prototype defect. The combination of virtual and silicon
device execution brings three major beneﬁts: (1) helping developers more easily
and better understand a silicon device using its virtual prototype, (2) checking for
defects in the silicon device, and (3) detecting bugs in the virtual prototype.
Eﬀective Fault Injection for Driver Robustness Testing. Device drivers
ought to be robust enough for handling diﬀerent kinds of device faults instead
of crashing or hanging the system. We ﬁrst develop a virtual prototype-based
fault injection approach by extending test case generation framework. The virtu-
al prototype-based fault injection approach employs two fault models to generate
device-related fault scenarios. After applying the approach to virtual prototype-
s of three widely-used network adapters, we have generated thousands of virtual
prototype-based fault scenarios and triggered two driver crashes. Furthermore, to
test the interfaces between device drivers and kernel API functions, we propose
an automatic driver fault injection approach to generation and injection of fault
7scenarios with either virtual prototypes or silicon devices. Our approach runs a
driver test and collects the corresponding runtime trace. Then we identify target
functions which can fail from the captured trace, and generate eﬀective fault s-
cenarios on these target functions. Each generated fault scenario includes a fault
conﬁguration which is applied to guide further fault injection. Each fault scenario
is applied to guide one instance of runtime fault injection and generate further fault
scenarios. This process is repeated until all fault scenarios have been tested. To
achieve systematic and eﬀective fault injection, we have developed two key strate-
gies. First, a bounded trace-based iterative generation strategy is developed for
generating eﬀective fault scenarios. Second, a permutation-based injection strategy
is developed to assure the ﬁdelity of runtime fault injection.
1.3 DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
a brief overview of background including virtual prototypes, symbolic execution
and driver robustness testing. Chapter 3 presents symbolic execution of virtual
prototypes which provides foundational support for our post-silicon functional val-
idation. Chapter 4 elaborates coverage evaluation of post-silicon tests. Chapter 5
presents our approach to automatic concolic test generation. Chapter 6 illustrates
automatic driver fault injection. Chapter 7 concludes and discusses future work.
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BACKGROUND
2.1 VIRTUAL PROTOTYPES AND QEMU VIRTUAL DEVICES
Virtual prototypes are fast, fully functional software models of hardware systems,
which enable unmodiﬁed execution of software code. QEMU is a generic, open
source machine emulator and virtualizer [10, 27]. We adopt QEMU virtual devices
as the virtual prototypes for our study due to the open-source nature of QEMU
and its wide varieties of virtual devices. Technology developed on QEMU virtual
devices can be readily generalized to other open-source or commercial virtual pro-
totyping environments due to their similarity in virtualization concepts, despite
their diﬀerent levels of modeling details.
To better understand the concept of virtual prototype, we illustrate it with
a QEMU virtual device for the Intel E1000 Gigabit network adapter. The E1000
adapter is a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) device which communicates
with its control software through interface registers and interrupts. The E1000
virtual device has corresponding functions to support such communication, for
instance, interface register functions and interrupt functions. In order to realize
the functionalities of silicon devices, the E1000 virtual device also needs to maintain
the device state and implement functions that virtualize device transactions and
environment inputs. As shown in Figure 2.1, the E1000 virtual device has the
following components:
9// 1. Device state
typedef struct E1000State_st {
PCIDevice dev; //PCI conﬁguration
uint32 t mac_reg[0x8000]; //Interface registers
......
uint32 t rxbuf_size; //Internal variables
......
} E1000State;
// 2. Interface register function: write register
static void write_reg(void *opaque, uint64 t index, uint32 t value) {
E1000State *s = (E1000State *)opaque;
......
if(index == TRANSMIT) {
s->mac_reg[index] = value;
start_xmit(s); //Invoking transaction function
}
......
}
// 3. Device transaction function: transmit packets
static void start_xmit(E1000State *s) {
......
pci_dma_read(&s->dev, base, &desc, sizeof(desc)); //Invoking DMA functions
......
set_irq(s->dev.irq[0],1); //Invoking interrupt function
}
// 4. Environment function: receive packets
static ssize t receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8 t *buf, size t size) {
......
pci_dma_write(&s->dev, base, &desc, sizeof(desc)); //Invoking DMA functions
.....
set_irq(s->dev.irq[0],1); //Invoking interrupt function
}
Figure 2.1: Excerpt of QEMU E1000 Virtual Device
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• The device state, E1000State, which keeps track of the state of the E1000
device and the device conﬁguration;
• The interface register functions such as write reg which are invoked by QE-
MU to access interface registers and trigger transaction functions;
• The device transaction functions such as start xmit which are invoked by
the interface register functions to realize the functionality;
• The environment functions such as receive which are invoked by QEMU to
pass environment inputs such as a packet received to the virtual device.
Both the device transaction functions and environment functions may access
DMA data by calling DMA functions pci dma write and pci dma read, as well as
ﬁre interrupts by calling interrupt function set irq. Both PCI interface functions
and environment input functions are device entry functions which are invoked by
QEMU to trigger device functionalities.
2.2 SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
Symbolic execution executes a program with symbolic values as inputs instead of
concrete ones and represents the values of program variables as symbolic expres-
sions. Consequently, the outputs computed by the program are expressed as a
function of input symbolic values. The symbolic state of a program includes the
symbolic values of program variables, a path condition, and a program counter.
The path condition is a boolean formula over the symbolic inputs; it accumulates
constraints which the inputs must satisfy for the symbolic execution to follow the
particular path. The program counter points to the next statement to execute. A
symbolic execution tree captures the paths explored by the symbolic execution of a
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program: the nodes represent the symbolic program states and the arcs represent
the state transitions.
int f(int x)
{
if (x < 0) return −x;
if (x == 1) return 2;
return x;
}
x < 0
x = *
x == 1
return 2 return x
return -x FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
x < 0 x ≥ 0
x == 1 x ≠ 1
Figure 2.2: An Example of Symbolic Execution
We use the program in Figure 2.2 to illustrate how symbolic execution is con-
ducted. At the entry, x has a symbolic value, i.e., any value allowed by its type
(in this case, integer). At each branching point, the path condition is updated
with conditions on the inputs to select between the two alternative paths. For this
example, we can get three paths based on symbolic execution. Each path will have
its own path condition, for example, x < 0 for the leftmost path.
2.3 POST-SILICON CONFORMANCE CHECKING
In previous work [43, 44, 45], we have developed an approach to post-silicon con-
formance checking of a silicon device with its virtual device. The conformance
between the silicon and virtual devices is deﬁned over their interface states. The
request sequence issued to the device is ﬁrst captured on the silicon device, and
then replayed on the virtual device to check if the interface states of the silicon
and virtual devices are consistent.
In Chapter 4 and 5, we utilize conformance checking for ensuring ﬁdelity of
coverage evaluation and evaluating eﬃciency of test generation results.
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2.4 DRIVER ROBUSTNESS TESTING
According to the IEEE standard [1], robustness is deﬁned as the degree to which
a system operates correctly in the presence of exceptional inputs or stressful en-
vironmental conditions in software testing. The goal of robustness testing is to
develop test cases and test environments where the robustness of a system can be
assessed.
Kernel modules, especially device drivers, play a critical role in operating sys-
tems. It is important to assure that device drivers behave safely and reliably to
avoid system crashes. Typically device drivers can work correctly under normal
situations. However, it is easy for driver developers to mishandles certain corner
cases, such as low resource situations, PCI bus errors and DMA failures.
int * p = (int *)kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
p[10] = 3;
Figure 2.3: An Example with Kernel API Function Call
As shown in Figure 2.3, the kmalloc function is invoked to allocate a block of
memory. After the function returns, the returned pointer is directly used without
null pointer checking. Under normal system conditions, the kmalloc function re-
turns successfully with a correct pointer to the allocated memory. However, when
the kmalloc function returns a null pointer under a low resource situation, it is
possible for the driver to crash the system. To handle such errors, the common
approach is to add an error handling mechanism.
As shown in Figure 2.4, after the kmalloc function returns, the code checks
whether the return value is a null pointer . If the kmalloc function returns a null
pointer, the corresponding error handler is invoked to handle the error. However,
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int * p = (int *)kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if(!p) goto error;
p[10] = 3;
......
error: error_handler();
Figure 2.4: An Example with Error Handler
a further concern is whether the error is handled correctly and does not trigger
other driver or system errors.
To improve driver robustness, a device driver should be tested to see whether
there exist two kinds of bugs: (1) driver error handling code does not exist; (2)
driver error handling mechanisms do not handle the error correctly or trigger other
driver/system issues. The ﬁrst kind seems to be easy to avoid as long as driver
developers write and check the code carefully. However, it still happens in the real
world. The second kind is usually diﬃcult and expensive to test.
2.5 RUNTIME DRIVER FAULT INJECTION
In driver robustness testing, all possible error conditions of a driver ought to be
exercised. However, certain error conditions might be diﬃcult and expensive to
trigger, but eﬀorts should be made to force or to simulate such errors to test the
driver. Fault injection is a technique for software robustness testing by introducing
faults to test code paths, in particular error handling code paths that, otherwise,
might rarely be followed. Recently, fault injection techniques have been widely
explored and studied for software testing and system robustness testing.
Runtime driver fault injection can be employed to simulate kernel interface
failures to trigger and test error handling code. The common approach to driver
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void * kmalloc(size t size, int flags) {
// Memory allocation operations
}
void * kmalloc_fault(size t size, int flags) {
return NULL;
}
Figure 2.5: A Driver Fault Injection Example
fault injection is to hijack the kernel function calls, such as kmalloc and vmalloc.
By hijacking these functions, we can call the corresponding fault function to return
a false result instead of invoking these functions. As shown in Figure 2.5, when
kmalloc is invoked, the corresponding fault function kmalloc fault is invoked to
return a null pointer instead of a correct pointer to simulate an allocation error.
In this way, we can test if device drivers can survive on diﬀerent error handling
code paths to improve driver robustness.
There are two main limitations with current driver fault injection. First, there
is no automatic framework to support fault injection for diﬀerent system function
calls. Second, there is no a systematic test generation approach to generate eﬀec-
tive fault scenarios. Currently most fault injections tools are using random fault
injection which is facing major challenges in achieving desired eﬀectiveness and
avoiding duplicate fault scenarios.
In Chapter 6, we provide a framework which can automatically generate and
inject fault scenarios at runtime. We have proposed a trace-based iterative gen-
eration strategy to produce unique and eﬀective fault scenarios and developed a
permutation-based replay mechanism to inject fault scenarios with high ﬁdelity.
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Chapter 3
SYMBOLIC EXECUTION OF VIRTUAL PROTOTYPES
3.1 OVERVIEW
Symbolic execution of virtual prototypes is the foundation for our approach to
coverage evaluation and test generation. In order to symbolically execute virtual
prototypes, we must address the following technical challenges:
• Environment modeling. A virtual device is not a stand-alone program. There
are two issues with this incompleteness. First, the virtual device needs to be
properly initialized and its entry functions properly exercised. Second, the
virtual device may invoke libraries in its environment. Therefore, we need a
solution to enclose the virtual device so that the symbolic execution engine
can consume it and perform accurate and eﬃcient analysis.
• Symbolic execution engine adaptation. We symbolically execute virtual de-
vices using the KLEE symbolic execution engine. KLEE is not specially de-
signed for executing virtual devices while virtual devices have speciﬁc charac-
teristics. Hence, we need to adapt KLEE to execute virtual devices eﬃciently
and provide more hardware-speciﬁc information.
Section 3.2 and 3.3 show the solutions for solving the above two challenges.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that our approach employs symbolic execution en-
gine to support both symbolic execution and analysis of virtual prototypes in
Section 3.4.
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3.2 HARNESS GENERATION
For symbolic execution of QEMU virtual devices, we adapt KLEE to handle the
non-deterministic entry function calls and symbolic inputs to device models. Since
the virtual device by itself is not a stand-alone program, in order for the symbolic
engine to execute a virtual device, a harness must be provided for the virtual
device. A key challenge here is how to create such a harness. This harness has to
be faithful so that the symbolic execution of the virtual device will not generate
too many paths infeasible in the real device. On the other hand, it has to be simple
enough so that symbolic engine can handle the symbolic execution eﬃciently. To
an extreme, the complete QEMU with the guest OS can serve as the harness which,
however, is impractical for the symbolic engine to handle.
Currently we generate harnesses manually for major device categories. Since
devices fall into device categories depending on interface types such as PCI and
USB and on functionalities such as network adapters and massive storage devices,
we started with creating harnesses for major device categories, e.g., PCI network
adapters, and improved such a harness as we experiment on devices in this category.
Manual harness generation involves examining how QEMU invokes the virtual de-
vice, what QEMU APIs that a virtual device invokes, and what these APIs invoke
recursively, and deciding what to include. At times, it may be necessary to make
an API produce non-deterministic outputs by throwing away its implementation.
The harness includes the following parts as shown in Figure 3.1:
• Declarations of state variables and parameters of entry functions. A virtual
device is not a stand-alone program. If a virtual device is running in a
virtual machine, it will register its entry functions with the virtual machine.
Moreover, the virtual machine will help the virtual device manage its state
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//Declarations of necessary variables
E1000State state; //Device state
target phys addr t address; //Address
......
int main() {
//Load the concrete state
load_state(&state, sizeof(state), "state");
//Make parameters symbolic
make_symbolic(&address, sizeof(address), "address");
......
//Non−deterministic calls to entry functions
switch(svd_deviceEntry) {
case MMIO_WRITE:
write_reg((void *)&state, address, value);
break;
case MMIO_READ:
read_reg((void *)&state, address);
break;
......
}
}
//Stub functions
uint16 t net_checksum_finish(uint32 t sum) {
......
}
Figure 3.1: Excerpt of E1000 Virtual Device Harness
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variables. Every time an entry function is invoked, the state variables and
necessary parameters of the function will be made available to the function
by the virtual machine. In order to exercise a virtual device symbolically, we
need to handle the state variables and function parameters. Hence, we add
declarations of state variables and inputs of entry functions to the harness.
• Code for loading the concrete state and making parameters of entry functions
symbolic. In order to cover as many paths as possible in an entry function,
we need to make certain inputs of the entry function symbolic. The in-
puts of an entry function contain state variables and necessary parameters.
We implement two utility functions that are specially handled by the en-
gine. Function “load state” is used for loading the concrete state. Function
“make symbolic” is used for initializing the inputs symbolically.
• Non-deterministic calls to virtual device entry functions. For a real device,
there are many ways for the OS and the environment to communicate with it.
Similarly, virtual devices provide many types of entry functions for communi-
cating with the OS and the environment. To analyze a virtual device, we go
through all entry functions with symbolic inputs. We deﬁne a symbolic vari-
able in the harness. With this symbolic variable, we make non-deterministic
calls to all entry functions.
• Stub functions for virtual machine API functions invoked by virtual devices.
Virtual devices often invoke API functions of virtual machines to achieve
certain functionalities. Stubs for these functions need to be provided to
complete the harness and are created manually as discussed above.
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3.3 SYMBOLIC EXECUTION ENGINE ADAPTATION
To improve eﬃciency of symbolic execution, we modify KLEE to address four key
technical challenges for symbolic execution of virtual devices.
3.3.1 Path Explosion Problem
Path explosion is a major limitation for symbolic execution to thoroughly test
software programs. The number of paths through a program is roughly exponential
in program size. The problem also exists in executing virtual devices symbolically.
We apply two constraints when executing the virtual device to combat the path
explosion problem. First, we add a loop bound to each loop whose loop condition
is a symbolic expression. With the loop bound, the user controls the depth of each
loop explored. Currently, we add the loop bounds manually in virtual devices.
This is practical since there are only a few loops in our analysis of three virtual
devices. Second, we can add a time bound to ensure that symbolic execution will
terminate in a given amount of time. If the symbolic execution does not complete
within the given time bound, there may be unﬁnished paths. For such paths, we
still generate test cases with path constraints obtained so far.
3.3.2 Environment Interaction Problem
A virtual device is a software component and may invoke outside API functions
to interact with its environment. We divide such interactions into two categories
based on whether a function call aﬀects the values of variables in virtual devices.
We detect whether the function has any pointer argument, accesses global vari-
ables, or returns a value. If so, this function potentially aﬀects the values of vari-
ables in virtual devices. We then use two diﬀerent mechanisms to handle functions
in these two categories.
20
• If the function call does not aﬀect the values of variables in virtual devices,
we instruct KLEE to ignore it and issue a warning.
• If the function call may aﬀect values of variables in virtual devices, we imple-
ment this function in our stubs. As there are not many such function calls
for a category of virtual devices, such manual eﬀort is acceptable.
3.3.3 Handling DMA
When a virtual device is processing a request, DMA data may be needed. QEMU
provides two functions “pci dma read” and “pci dma write” for reading and writ-
ing DMA data separately. We ignore “pci dma write” function because it does
not aﬀect the device state. We instruct the symbolic execution engine to specially
handle “pci dma read” function.
We hook “pci dma read” function to capture all run-time DMA read data in
the concrete execution of the virtual device within the virtual machine. Then we
utilize the captured data in both replay process and test generation process. In the
replay process, every time “pci dma read” function is invoked, the corresponding
data is loaded into the virtual device by the symbolic execution engine. In the
test generation process, we compose a symbolic DMA sequence using the captured
DMA data to guide test case generation.
3.3.4 Sparse Function Pointer Array Problem
A virtual device provides many diﬀerent functions for realizing diﬀerent device
behaviors. For example, if a write register operation is issued to the virtual device,
diﬀerent functions can be triggered depending on diﬀerent register oﬀsets. There-
fore, it is common for virtual devices to utilize a sparse function pointer array
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//Declarations of a sparse function pointer array
static uint32 t (*macreg_readops[])(E1000State *, int) = {
[RCTL] = mac_readreg, [TCTL] = mac_readreg, [ICS] = mac_readreg,
[GPTC] = mac_read_clr4, [TPR] = mac_read_clr4, [TPT] = mac_read_clr4,
[ICR] = mac_icr_read, [EECD] = get_eecd, [EERD] = flash_eerd_read,
......
}
enum { NREADOPS = ARRAY_SIZE(macreg_readops) };
//Invoke the function using the function pointer
static uint64 t e1000_mmio_read(void *opaque, target phys addr t addr,
unsigned size)
{
E1000State *s = opaque;
unsigned int index = (addr & 0x1ffff) >> 2;
if (index < NREADOPS && macreg_readops[index])
{
return macreg_readops[index](s, index);
}
......
}
Figure 3.2: An Example of A Sparse Function Pointer Array
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for accessing diﬀerent functions, which makes the code concise. A sparse function
pointer array is shown in Figure 3.2 which is used by QEMU E1000 virtual device.
If a symbolic execution engine invokes a function deﬁned in the sparse function
pointer array with a symbolic oﬀset, the engine tries to explore all possible array
oﬀsets in order to cover all functions in the array. In this example, the symbolic
engine needs to fork 5845 branches when the “macreg readops” array is accessed.
It takes much time to explore all 5845 branches. Actually only 7 functions are
included in this function array. We summarize this information by static analysis
of the virtual device. We modify the symbolic execution engine to specially handle
sparse function pointer arrays. Every time a sparse function pointer array is ac-
cessed, we only fork branches according to the number of valid functions. In this
example, we only fork 7 branches.
3.4 RUNTIME SHADOW EXECUTION
We ﬁrst apply symbolic execution of virtual prototypes to runtime shadow exe-
cution to better understand runtime device state transitions. Runtime shadow
execution allows the developer to monitor or diagnose a virtual device’s behavior
at runtime, ideal for the driver development and testing environment. Runtime
shadow execution enables us to analyze run-time state transitions. We can follow
the device sequence to trace all state transitions from the initial state. The detailed
information of each state transition can be observed.
3.4.1 Runtime Shadow Execution Framework
To better understand device state transitions, we integrate symbolic execution of
virtual devices into the virtual machine at runtime. The framework for runtime
shadow execution is shown in Figure 3.3. The SEE interface has been implemented
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as the bridge between virtual machine and SEE. Our framework can support two
mode: monitor and analysis modes.
Symbolic Execution Environment 
(SEE)
Harness
Virtual Device
...
SEE interface
...
Virtual Machine (VM)
Application
Virtual Device
Operating System
Device Driver
Figure 3.3: Framework for Runtime Analysis
Our runtime framework does not change the normal working process of the
virtual machine. The framework only intercepts the communications between the
virtual machine and the virtual device. Furthermore, our framework implements
the SEE interface to act as the bridge transferring data from the virtual machine
to SEE. The SEE interface intercepts three types of data:
1) Device states: It captures concrete device states when runtime shadow
execution is enabled.
2) I/O requests and packets: It captures I/O requests and packets when there
is a device request from either the driver or the environment.
3) DMA data: It captures DMA data when DMA data is accessed for pro-
cessing a device request.
With the captured data, the virtual device can be executed concretely in mon-
itor mode or symbolically in analysis mode.
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3.4.2 Runtime Monitor Mode
In the monitor mode, the virtual device is executed concretely in both the virtual
machine and SEE simultaneously. With the captured data through SEE interface,
concrete execution can be conducted to enable runtime step-by-step analysis, which
helps developers thoroughly understand the concrete state transition for processing
a device request.
The harness for runtime monitor is slightly diﬀerent from the harness for static
analysis. An example of such harness is shown in Figure 3.4. Two special functions
“load state” and “load request” are employed to load captured concrete device
states and request information within the SEE. Then the corresponding entry
function is invoked according to the request type.
Usually developers would like to analyze some desired state transitions. We
provide two mechanisms to help developers select desired state transitions.
First, we provide a special user-level program to issue special I/O requests to
label the start and ﬁnish points of a test case. The SEE interface parses all I/O
requests. Once the special I/O requests are found, the SEE checks what kind
of ﬂag the request stands for. If it is a start ﬂag, the SEE starts analyzing the
upcoming requests. If it is a ﬁnish ﬂag, the SEE stops analyzing the requests that
follow.
3.4.3 Runtime Analysis Mode
The virtual device is executed concretely in the virtual machine and symbolically
in the SEE simultaneously. The SEE executes the virtual device with the concrete
device state and symbolic requests. It computes all the feasible execution paths
under the current device state and generates runtime analysis test cases for the
covered paths.
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//Declarations of necessary variables
E1000State state; //Device state
target phys addr t address; //Address
......
int main() {
//Load the concrete device state
load_state(&state, sizeof(E1000State), "state");
//Load the concrete device request and request type
load_request(&address, sizeof(address), "address");
......
//Calls to interface functions
switch(svd_deviceEntry) {
case MMIO_WRITE:
e1000_mmio_write((void *)&state, address, value);
break;
case MMIO_READ:
e1000_mmio_read((void *)&state, address);
break;
......
}
}
Figure 3.4: Complete Harness for Runtime Monitor Mode
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The harness for runtime analysis is the same as the one shown in Figure 3.1. Our
approach assists developers in analyzing a virtual device symbolically at runtime.
Once a request is selected or a breakpoint is hit in monitor mode, the virtual
device can be executed symbolically with a symbolic request under the concrete
state. All possible paths are explored. For each possible path, a runtime analysis
test case is generated which contains the concrete device state and inputs that
can be used to replay the corresponding path symbolically explored. Replaying
the test case enables developers better observe and trace any variable change in
the virtual device along this path. Furthermore, all paths explored at runtime are
reachable. The developers can conﬁrm what paths covered by static analysis can
be covered at runtime. The developers can also alter the virtual device execution
by injecting a device request identiﬁed by the SEE.
3.4.4 Further Potentials
This section illustrates how to employ symbolic execution of virtual prototypes
to support runtime monitoring and analysis. There are two major functionalities
provided by our symbolic execution approach.
First, it can thoroughly analyze each state transition and collect related infor-
mation. It can support not only runtime monitoring but also coverage evaluation
which is demonstrated in Chapter 4.
Second, it can execute a virtual prototype with a concrete state and symbolic
requests. It can support not only runtime analysis but also test generation and
fault generation which are demonstrated in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
COVERAGE EVALUATION OF POST-SILICON VALIDATION TESTS
4.1 MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
Post-silicon validation has become a bottleneck in system development cycle and is
a signiﬁcant, growing part of overall validation cost [38]. To speed-up post-silicon
validation, some tasks should be conducted early in the pre-silicon stage, e.g.,
development and evaluation of post-silicon validation tests. Test coverage is an
important metric for evaluating the quality and readiness of post-silicon validation
tests. Precise coverage results are necessary for engineers to judge whether existing
test suites can achieve suﬃcient coverage and cover desired functionalities on the
device.
Before the ﬁrst silicon prototype is ready, it is very challenging to quantify
coverage of post-silicon validation tests since we do not have a silicon device to
run these tests on. Even if a silicon prototype is ready, the black box nature of the
silicon prototype only supports limited observability and traceability that makes
post-silicon validation diﬃcult.
As shown in Figure 4.1, virtual prototypes and silicon devices are running re-
spectively in virtual platforms and physical machines. Virtual prototypes can pro-
vide the same transaction-level functionalities as silicon devices to support driver
development and validation. Virtual prototypes have major potential to play a cru-
cial role in estimating silicon device functional coverage of post-silicon validation
tests. The white box nature of virtual prototypes brings complete observability
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Figure 4.1: From Physical to Virtual
and traceability that evades silicon devices. It is possible to have thorough test
coverage evaluation over virtual prototypes.
This chapter presents an online-capture oﬄine-replay approach to coverage e-
valuation of post-silicon validation tests with virtual prototypes. We ﬁrst capture
necessary run-time data, including the initial device state and device requests from
a concrete execution of the virtual prototype within a virtual platform under a giv-
en test. We then compute the test coverage by eﬃciently replaying captured data
oﬄine on the virtual prototype itself. To evaluate the coverage, we have adopted
four typical software coverage metrics and developed two hardware-speciﬁc cov-
erage metrics: register and transaction coverage. To ensure ﬁdelity of coverage
estimation on the silicon device, we further extend our approach to compute cov-
erage after the silicon device becomes ready and check conformance with coverage
estimate on the virtual prototype.
We have implemented this approach in Device Coverage Analyzer (DCA), a
coverage analysis tool using virtual prototypes. We have applied our approach to
evaluate a suite of common tests with virtual prototypes of ﬁve network adapters.
Our approach was able to reliably estimate that this suite achieves high functional
coverage on all ﬁve silicon devices.
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4.2 PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS FOR VIRTUAL DEVICES
In order to help better understand chapter 4 and 5, we introduce several deﬁnitions
and deﬁne a formal model for a virtual device.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A device state is denoted as s= 〈sI , sN〉 where sI is the interface
state including all interface registers and sN is the internal state including all
internal registers. The interface state sI can be accessed by a high-level software
(e.g., driver) while sN is only accessed by the device itself.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the structure E1000State represents the E1000 device
state and includes interface registers mac reg and an internal register rxbuf size.
Deﬁnition 4.2. An interface register request is denoted as rir which is issued
by drivers to access interface registers.
Deﬁnition 4.3. An environment input is denoted as rei which is received by
the device from the environment.
Deﬁnition 4.4. A device request is denoted as r which is issued by high-level
software to control and operate the device.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the parameters index and value of interface register
function write reg can be treated as a request r, which is issued by the driver to
modify the interface register and trigger the transaction function.
Direct memory access (DMA) is a feature of modern computers that allows
certain devices to access system memory independent of CPU. In order to process
a device request r, a device might read/write data using DMA.
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Deﬁnition 4.5. A DMA sequence is denoted as d = d1, d2, ..., dn where di is
the ith DMA data accessed for processing one request.
Deﬁnition 4.6. A device event is denoted as e = 〈r,d〉 where r is a device
request and d is a sequence of DMA data. For some event e, d might be null since
no DMA data is needed for processing r.
Deﬁnition 4.7. A sequence of device events is denoted as seq = e1, e2, ...,
en. A subsequence seqk of seq contains the ﬁrst k events of seq where seqk =
e1, e2, ..., ek. After processing a sequence of device events, the device can be
transitioned to a new state from the initial state.
Deﬁnition 4.8. A test case is denoted as tc = 〈seq, e〉, where seq is a sequence
of device events and e is an additional device event. The device is transitioned to
a desired state from the initial state after processing seq. Then the device event e
is issued to the device to trigger the desired device functionality.
Deﬁnition 4.9. A state under test is denoted as sut where sut is the device
state on which test cases are generated.
Devices are transactional in nature: device requests are processed by device
transactions. For a virtual device (which is a program), given a state s and a
device request r, a program path of the virtual device is executed and the device
is transitioned into a new state. Each distinct program path of the virtual device
represents a distinct device transaction.
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Deﬁnition 4.10. A device transaction, denoted as t = l1, l2, ..., ln., is a
program path of a virtual device. Each step l in the path is a tuple (λ, γ, ξ),
where λ is the code statement executed, γ is the registers accessed and ξ is the
interrupt status.
start_xmit(s);
s->mac_reg[STATUS] =
~E1000_STATUS_LU;
Register write
Offset: STATUS
Value: ~E1000_STATUS_LU
qemu_set_irq(s->dev.irq[0],
(s->mac_reg[IMS] & s->mac_reg[ICR]) != 0);
Interrupt status
Value: (s->mac_reg[IMS]
& s->mac_reg[ICR]) != 0
Harness
Line 832
Line 34
Line 116
…...
Figure 4.2: A Transaction Example
Figure 4.2 gives an example of a transaction. Besides the basic code statement
sequence, the transaction t also contains hardware-related information, such as
the registers accessed and the interrupt status.
A virtual device is a transaction-level model of hardware design which can be
represented as an event-driven state transition graph. As shown in Figure 4.3,
given a device state sk−1 and a device event ek, the device will transit to a new
device state sk. We use s
e→ s′ to denote a transaction.
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sk-1 snsn-1s0
e1 --- ek-1
sk
enek ek+1 --- en-1
Figure 4.3: A Graph Representation of State Transitions
4.3 ONLINE-CAPTURE OFFLINE-REPLAY COVERAGE EVALU-
ATION
Before a silicon device is ready, post-silicon validation tests can be evaluated us-
ing RTL emulation. However, emulating hardware design has certain limitations.
First, RTL emulators can be very expensive. Second, RTL emulation is often s-
low. Third, it requires a complete working RTL design [62] to evaluate post-silicon
validation tests. Recently virtual devices and virtual platforms have been used for
driver development and validation before a silicon device is ready. Virtual devices
are software components. Compared to their hardware counterparts, it is easier
to achieve observability and traceability on virtual devices. This makes virtual
devices amenable to coverage evaluation of post-silicon validation tests.
4.3.1 Online-capture
In order to compute test coverage on virtual devices, we need to collect necessary
run-time data from the virtual platform. A na¨ıve idea is to capture all necessary
run-time data including execution information of virtual devices directly from the
virtual platform. However, such approach has three disadvantages. First, we need
to instrument virtual devices to capture execution information of virtual devices.
Second, capturing detailed execution information introduces heavy overhead into
the virtual platform. Third, we need to decide what kinds of information should be
captured before run-time execution of the virtual platform. It is hard to guarantee
that captured information is suﬃcient. Once a new metric is added, it is possible
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that we have to modify the capture mechanism and then rerun the virtual platform
to capture more data.
Therefore, we developed an online-capture oﬄine-replay approach to capture
minimum necessary data at run-time, and then replay the run-time data on the
virtual device itself oﬄine to collect necessary execution information.
A device can be treated as a state transition system. As shown in Figure 4.3,
given a device state sk−1 and a device event ek, the device will transit to a new
device state sk. Therefore, with the initial state s0 and the whole event sequence
seq, we can infer all states and reproduce all state transitions. In other words,
capturing s0 and seq from the concrete execution of a virtual device within the
virtual platform should introduce the lowest overhead and deliver the most eﬀective
data.
4.3.2 Oﬄine-replay
Our oﬄine-replay mechanism reproduces run-time execution on virtual devices
with s0 and seq, which provides ﬂexible analysis mechanism and powerful debug
capability.
Flexible analysis mechanism
The replay process is independent of the virtual platform/physical machine. Once
run-time data is captured, users can replay the event sequence and reproduce the
execution at any time. Based on diﬀerent user requirements, users can generate
diﬀerent coverage reports from the replay process with diﬀerent metrics.
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Powerful debug capability
The replay mechanism provides capability for debugging interesting execution
traces on virtual devices statement by statement, backward and forward.
Algorithm 1 Replay Events (s0, seq)
1: i ← 0; //loop iteration
2: s ← s0; //Set initial device state
3: while i < seq.size() do
4: e ← seq[i];
5: 〈t, snext〉 ←Execute Virtual Device (s, e);
6: T.save(t);
7: s ← snext; //Set next device state
8: i ← i + 1;
9: end while
10: Generate Report (T);
Algorithm 1 illustrates how to replay all events with s0 and seq to collect
necessary execution information. In Algorithm 1, T is a temporary vector for
saving execution information for all events. The algorithm takes the initial device
state s0 and the event sequence seq as inputs. Before replaying the event sequence,
we set s0 as the device state s. We run the virtual device with each event e in
the event sequence seq and the corresponding state s to compute the execution
information t and the next state snext. Then t is saved in T and snext is assigned
to s. After replaying all events, we generate coverage reports based on T and user
conﬁguration.
35
4.3.3 Coverage Computation and Conformance Checking in the Post-
silicon Stage
In our approach, we use coverage evaluation of virtual prototypes to estimate
functional coverage on silicon devices. In order to make our approach practical
and reliable, we need to address the following two key challenges:
1) Accuracy: In our approach, we capture run-time data from the concrete
execution of virtual devices within a virtual platform. Events (Ev) issued to virtual
devices within a virtual platform can be diﬀerent from events (Es) issued to silicon
devices within a physical machine for the same tests. The concern is whether the
coverage (Cv) computed on (Ev) is a good approximation of the coverage (Cs)
computed on (Es).
2) Conformance: Another challenge is whether coverage estimation on virtual
devices can really reﬂect functional silicon device coverage. Although both virtu-
al devices and silicon devices are developed according to the same speciﬁcation,
whether they conform to each other is still a major concern.
To address the above two challenges, we have extended our approach to sup-
port coverage computation and conformance checking after the silicon device is
ready. We ﬁrst reset the silicon device, and then capture run-time data, includ-
ing all silicon device states SS = {ss0, ss1, ..., ssn} and the device event sequence
seq = e1, e2, ..., en, from the concrete execution of a silicon device within a physical
machine. For a silicon device, interface registers are observable while the internal
registers are not observable in general. Therefore it is only possible to record all
silicon device interface states SSI = {ssI0, ssI1, ..., ssIn} due to the limited observ-
ability. Algorithm 2 shows the extended algorithm for replaying SSI and seq on
the virtual device.
In Algorithm 2, we ﬁrst reset the virtual device to get the initial device state s.
36
Algorithm 2 Extended Replay Events (SSI , seq)
1: k ← 0; //loop iteration
2: s ← Reset Virtual Device (); //s = 〈sI , sN〉
3: while k < seq.size() do
4: sI ← ssIk; //Load captured silicon device interface state
5: e ← seq[k + 1];
6: 〈t, s′〉 ←Execute Virtual Device (s, e); //s′ = 〈s′I , s′N〉
7: T.save(t);
8: Check Conformance (s′I , ssI(k+1));
9: sN ← s′N ;
10: k ← k + 1;
11: end while
12: Generate Report (T);
We assume that the internal states between the silicon device and its virtual device
are the same after resetting devices. Even if both internal states are not exactly the
same, a few diﬀerences should not cause a large number of functional diﬀerences
according to device speciﬁcations. We take the captured device state ssIk and ek+1
as inputs to replay one event. The virtual device is executed with s and ek+1 to
compute the execution information and the state s′ after processing ek+1. Then
conformance checking is conducted between the computed interface state s′I on
the virtual device and the captured interface state ssI(k+1) on the silicon device to
detect inconsistencies. After replaying one event, we keep the internal state and
load next interface state captured to compose the device state. After replaying all
events, we can get coverage reports and inconsistency report.
We utilize the coverage evaluation and conformance checking results in three
aspects to assure the coverage estimation accuracy. First, we compare Cs and Cv
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to detect diﬀerences. If we can verify that there is no diﬀerence or few diﬀerences
between Cv and Cs, we can better trust that Cv can be a good approximation of
Cs. Second, the number of inconsistencies provides basic measurement how many
diﬀerences there are between the silicon device and the virtual prototype. After
analyzing the inconsistencies, we further evaluate whether these inconsistencies
cause diﬀerent device behaviors. If there are few inconsistencies found and there
is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the device, it can increase our conﬁdence on coverage
estimation. Third, it is easy to ﬁx the detected inconsistencies on the virtual
device so that the ﬁxed virtual device conforms with the silicon device. Then
we compute coverage again on the ﬁxed virtual device using the same test cases.
By comparing the coverage report on the ﬁxed virtual device with that on the
silicon device, we further verify that the diﬀerences in coverage caused by the
inconsistencies are removed.
4.4 COVERAGE METRICS
Computing test coverage requires appropriate coverage metrics. In our approach,
we use virtual prototype coverage to estimate silicon device functional coverage. A
virtual prototype is not only a software program, but also models the characteristics
of the silicon device. Therefore we have employed two kinds of coverage metrics: we
have adopted the typical software coverage metrics and developed two hardware-
speciﬁc coverage metrics: register coverage and transaction coverage.
4.4.1 Code Coverage
Code coverage is a typical measure used in software testing. Virtual devices are
software models. We can apply all code coverage metrics to virtual devices. We
select four common coverage metrics: function coverage, statement coverage, block
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coverage and branch coverage.
4.4.2 Register Coverage
A hardware register stores bits of information in such a way that systems can
write to or read out from it all the bits simultaneously. High-level software can
determine the state of the device by reading registers, and control and operate the
device by writing registers. It is critical for engineers to know what registers have
been accessed so they can check whether the device is accessed correctly according
to the speciﬁcation. Virtual devices provide complete observability, therefore we
can capture accesses on both interface and internal registers. Actually in our
approach, we capture all register accesses and deliver diﬀerent kinds of register
coverage reports according to user conﬁguration.
4.4.3 Transaction Coverage
Devices and, therefore, virtual devices are transactional in nature: they receive
interface register requests and environment inputs, and process them concurrently
without interference. Thus, an interesting and useful metric is transaction cov-
erage. For a virtual device (which is a C program), given a state s and a device
request r, a program path of the virtual device is executed and the device is transi-
tioned into a new state. Each distinct program path of the virtual device represents
a distinct device transaction. When computing coverage, the impact of a test case
on the virtual device in term of what transactions it hits and how often they are
hit are recorded. The impact of a test suite can be recorded the same way. The
coverage statistics can be visualized using pie or bar charts in term of what and
how many requests were made, what and how many transactions were hit, and
what percentages they account for among all requests. Moreover, the details of a
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transaction is recorded, such as registers accessed and interrupt status.
4.5 IMPLEMENTATION
As shown in Figure 4.4, we ﬁrst capture necessary data from a concrete execution
of the virtual prototype within a virtual platform under a given test, and then
compute the test coverage by eﬃciently replaying this execution oﬄine on the
virtual prototype itself. Our approach provides early feedback on quality of post-
silicon validation tests before silicon is ready.
Operating System
Virtual Machine
Test Suite
Recorder
Virtual
Prototype
Execution Harness
Symbolic Engine
Virtual
Prototype
Coverage
Reports
Request
Sequence
Figure 4.4: Workﬂow for Coverage Evaluation
4.5.1 Coverage on Diﬀerent Levels
To generate coverage reports, we ﬁrst analyze virtual devices statically to get
program information, such as the position of branches and the number of functions,
and then generate all kinds of coverage reports based on the execution traces
computed by the replay engine. Our approach provides ﬂexibility to generate
reports on two diﬀerent levels:
1) Event Level: Given an event, a user can check what transaction is explored,
what registers are accessed and whether any interrupt is ﬁred. Moreover, the user
can debug the execution trace step by step using the replay engine.
2) Test Case/Suite Level: A test case/suite issues a sequence of requests to a
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device. Simultaneously, the device may receive environment inputs and read DMA
data. Given a test case/suite, all device events are captured. The replay engine
replays all captured events and generates the code coverage, the register coverage
and the transaction coverage for the test case/suite.
4.5.2 Implementation Details
We implement our approach on the QEMU virtual platform. The event capture
mechanism is implemented as a QEMU module which can be used for hooking QE-
MU virtual devices. Device interface functions are invoked by the QEMU frame-
work. For instance, a driver issues a read register request, the QEMU invokes the
corresponding read register function deﬁned in the virtual device. Our module
hooks all the interface functions when the virtual device registers these functions
to QEMU. In this way, the module captures the device events when there is an
interface register request, an environment input or a DMA access. This module
provides capability to hook diﬀerent virtual devices without modifying virtual de-
vices. For capturing events on silicon devices in physical machines, we modiﬁed
device drivers to achieve it.
We construct our replay engine using the symbolic execution engine KLEE [17].
We modify KLEE in three aspects. First, we implement some special function
handler for loading events and DMA data. Second, we capture execution trace
during execution of virtual devices. Third, we realize our own module for coverage
generation.
4.6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have applied DCA to QEMU-based virtual devices for ﬁve popular network
adapters: Intel E1000, Broadcom Tigon3, Intel EEPro100, AMD RTL8139 and
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Realtek PCNet. While our tool currently focuses on QEMU-based virtual devices,
the principles also apply to other virtual prototypes. The experiments were per-
formed on a desktop with an 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) X3470 CPU, 8 GB of RAM,
250GB and 7200RPM IDE disk drive and running the Ubuntu Linux OS with
64-bit kernel version 3.0.61.
4.6.1 Online-capture and Oﬄine-replay Overhead
In order to evaluate our approach, we capture a request sequence triggered by a
test suite. The test suite includes most common network testing programs, such as
ifconﬁg and ethtool [19]. DCA needs to capture the initial device state and device
events at run-time, which brings overhead to run-time QEMU environment. With
the capture mechanism, both QEMU and virtual devices work normally.
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Figure 4.5: Time Usage (Seconds) for Online Capture
To evaluate the overhead of online capture mechanism, we illustrate the time
usage for the whole test suite under the capture conﬁguration and no-capture
conﬁguration in Figure 4.5. Between the capture and no-capture conﬁgurations,
there is low running time overhead introduced. For example, the overhead for
E1000 is about (570 - 550) / 550 = 3.6%.
We further evaluated time and memory usages for the oﬄine replay process.
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As shown in Table 4.1, time and memory usages of the oﬄine replay are modest.
It only takes a few minutes to process tens of thousands events.
Table 4.1: Time and Memory Usages for Oﬄine Replay
Events(#) Time(Minutes) Memory(Mb)
E1000 65530 10.5 268.24
Tigon3 89032 12.0 336.35
EEPro100 30112 6.0 213.18
RTL8139 43228 7.0 225.26
PCNet 54016 8.5 254.60
4.6.2 Coverage Results
We demonstrate our coverage results in three aspects: code coverage (statemen-
t/block/branch/function coverage), register coverage and transaction coverage.
Due to space limitation, we only illustrate coverage results for E1000 below al-
though we have ﬁnished coverage evaluation on all ﬁve devices.
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Figure 4.6: Code Coverage Results for E1000
Figure 4.6 uses a stack to show incremental coverage of diﬀerent test programs
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on E1000 under diﬀerent code coverage metrics. We evaluate the coverage for both
a test case, such as sending a ping packet, and a test suite including most common
testing programs. These coverage results can give engineers basic measurement of
the quality of test cases.
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Figure 4.7: Top Ten Accessed Registers for E1000
Figure 4.7 shows partial register coverage results for E1000. Each register is
identiﬁed using the register oﬀset, such as 0x0 and 0x8. The ﬁgure shows that how
many times and how much percentage top ten registers are accessed. For instance,
the most accessed register is register 0x8 (status register), which is accessed 21927
times. The system software reads this register very frequently to query the device
state.
Figure 4.8 shows partial transaction coverage results for E1000. Each transac-
tion is identiﬁed using a hash value, such as 0xd4e4d3ed. It shows that how many
times and how much percentage top ten transactions are accessed. By analyzing
transaction coverage, engineers can know what functionalities have been tested. By
analyzing execution information of each transaction, engineers can further observe
register accesses.
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Figure 4.8: Top Ten Transactions for E1000
4.6.3 Coverage and Conformance Results in Post-silicon Stage
With the same test suite, we instrumented drivers to capture run-time data on
two silicon devices: E1000 and Tigon3, and computed the coverage on the cor-
responding virtual devices. We compare the results with these results shown in
Section 4.6.2. The coverage results are very similar for both E1000 and Tigon3 in
terms of code and register coverage. One major diﬀerence is reﬂected on transac-
tion coverage. Due to diﬀerent speeds of physical machine and virtual platform,
several transactions are aﬀected. For example, while transmitting network pack-
ets, silicon devices can transmit more packets than virtual devices in the transmit
transaction since the speed of silicon devices is much higher than virtual devices.
We conclude such diﬀerences in coverage are acceptable.
We applied conformance checking to detect inconsistencies between E1000 and
Tigon3 and their corresponding virtual devices. There are 13 inconsistencies dis-
covered between the two network adapters and their virtual devices under the given
tests: 7 in Intel E1000 and 6 in Broadcom BCM5751. We modiﬁed 21 lines of code
in virtual devices to ﬁx all 13 inconsistencies. Then we rerun coverage tools on
ﬁxed virtual devices to generate new coverage reports. After comparing the new
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reports with the post-silicon coverage reports, we found no diﬀerences except the
known transaction diﬀerences.
Remarks: Coverage evaluation in the post-silicon stage often requires instrument-
ing the device driver and comes too late. Coverage evaluation on virtual prototypes
can be available much earlier; therefore, it can guide improvement of post-silicon
tests. From conformance checking results and coverage report comparison, it is
clear the more conforming the virtual and silicon devices are, the more accurate
the coverage evaluation on the virtual device. Even if there exist inconsistencies,
conforming checking facilitates quick correction of coverage estimate in the post-
silicon stage by conveniently detecting these inconsistencies.
4.7 RELATED WORK
One common approach to post-silicon coverage evaluation is to use in-silicon cov-
erage monitors [8, 12, 50]. However, adding coverage monitors to the silicon is
costly in terms of timing, power, and area [3]. In order not to introduce too much
overhead, developers can only add a small number of coverage monitors in the de-
sign. Consequently, the eﬀectiveness of coverage evaluation highly relies on what
kinds of device signals are captured by in-line coverage monitors. Moreover, such
approach of using coverage monitors can take eﬀect only after silicon devices are
ready. Another approach to coverage evaluation of test cases before silicon devices
are available is RTL emulation. However, emulating hardware design has some
limitations as we discussed in 5.2.1. Our approach takes the obvious advantages of
virtual devices: complete observability and traceability, and is applicable without
silicon devices. We utilize test coverage over virtual devices to estimate silicon
device functional coverage.
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4.8 SUMMARY
Quantifying coverage of post-silicon validation tests is very challenging due to lim-
ited hardware observability [57]. In this chapter, We have presented an approach
to early coverage evaluation of post-silicon validation tests with virtual prototypes,
which fully leverages the observability and traceability of virtual prototypes. We
have applied our approach to evaluate a suite of common tests on virtual proto-
types of ﬁve network adapters. We have also established high conﬁdence in ﬁdelity
of coverage evaluation by further conducting coverage evaluation and conformance
checking on silicon devices.
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Chapter 5
AUTOMATIC CONCOLIC TEST GENERATION
5.1 MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
To accelerate post-silicon validation, high-quality tests should be ready before a
silicon device is available [57]. The time-to-market after the device is ﬁrst available
can be as short as several weeks. Therefore, it is highly desired to avoid spending
this precious time on preparing, debugging, and ﬁxing tests. There should be
high-quality tests available before the ﬁrst silicon prototype is ready.
Currently, tests for post-silicon functional validation mainly include random
tests, manually written tests, and end-user applications [33][79]. Random testing
can quickly generate many tests and is easy to use while facing major challenges in
achieving high coverage of device functionalities and avoiding high redundancy in
tests. Manually written tests are eﬃcient in testing speciﬁc device functionalities.
However, developing manual tests is labor-intensive and time-consuming. Further-
more, humans make mistakes when they write tests manually and it is diﬃcult
to check correctness of these tests until they are applied to a silicon device. End-
user applications are convenient and easy to deploy; however, it is often diﬃcult to
quantify what device functionalities are covered. In addition, end-user applications
are generally not device-speciﬁc, therefore often leading to insuﬃcient coverage of
device functionalities.
Recently virtual prototypes are increasingly used in hardware/software co-
development to enable early driver development and validation before hardware
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devices become available [62, 70]. Virtual prototypes also have major potential to
play a crucial role in test generation for post-silicon validation.
This chapter presents a concolic testing approach to automatic post-silicon test
generation with virtual prototypes. This work is inspired by recent advances in
concolic testing [30, 31]. Concolic (a portmanteau of concrete and symbolic) testing
is a hybrid software testing technique that integrates concrete execution with sym-
bolic execution [39]. In our approach, we borrow “concolic” literally and conduct
concolic test generation with virtual prototypes by integrating concrete runtime
execution and symbolic execution. We ﬁrst identify device states under test from
concrete executions of a virtual prototype using a transaction-based selection s-
trategy, and then symbolically execute the virtual prototype from these states.
Concrete tests are generated based on the symbolic path constraints obtained. We
apply the generated test cases to both the silicon device and the virtual prototype,
and check for inconsistencies between the real and virtual device states. Once
an inconsistency is detected, we can replay the test case on the virtual prototype
through symbolic execution to see whether it is a silicon device bug or a virtual
prototype defect. The combination of virtual and silicon device execution brings
three major beneﬁts: (1) help developers more easily and better understand a sil-
icon device using its virtual prototype, (2) check for defects in the silicon device,
and (3) detect bugs in the virtual prototype.
We have implemented our approach in a prototype post-silicon test genera-
tion tool, namely, ACTG (Automatic Concolic Test Generation). We have applied
ACTG to virtual prototypes for three widely-used network adapters. ACTG gen-
erates hundreds of unique tests for each device. These tests lead to signiﬁcant
improvement in coverage. When applying the generated test cases to the silicon
devices, ACTG detects 20 inconsistencies between the virtual and silicon devices.
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Our approach makes the following key contributions:
• Concolic testing for post-silicon validation. Our approach to post-silicon
device test generation not only integrates concrete and symbolic execution,
but also combines virtual and silicon device executions. The observability
and controllability of virtual prototypes are fully leveraged while generated
tests are compatible with silicon devices.
• Transaction-based test selection. A transaction-based test selection strategy
is developed to select device states under test and eliminate redundancy in
generated tests. This strategy not only helps generate test cases with high
functionality coverage in modest amount of time, but also produce eﬃcient
test cases with low redundancy.
5.2 CONCOLIC TEST GENERATION WITH VIRTUAL PROTO-
TYPES
5.2.1 A Na¨ıve Approach
Virtual devices are software components. Compared to their hardware counter-
parts, it is easier to achieve observability and traceability on virtual devices. This
makes virtual devices amenable to post-silicon test generation.
A na¨ıve approach to test generation with a virtual device is to apply symbolic
execution directly to it. A virtual device can be treated as an event-driven program
as shown in Figure 4.3. A virtual device processes a possibly unbounded sequence
of events from the initial state. In other words, a virtual device can be abstracted
as a program that has an inﬁnite loop as shown in Figure 5.1.
Within the main function, the device state is ﬁrst set to the initial state by
resetting the device. Then, there is an inﬁnite loop which is used for handling
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E1000State state; //Device state
int main() {
// Reset the device
device_reset(&state);
while(1) {
/∗ Read the next incoming event. Usually this is treated as a blocking
function. ∗/
EVENT event = read_next_device_event();
/∗ Handle the event based on the current state. ∗/
/∗ The corresponding entry function is invoked, e.g. write reg(...) −>
start xmit(...) ∗/
switch(event.type) {
case MMIO_WRITE:
write_reg((void *)&state, event.address, event.value);
break;
case MMIO_READ:
read_reg((void *)&state, event.address);
break;
......
}
}
}
Figure 5.1: Abstract Event-driven Model of QEMU E1000 Virtual Device
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device events. The loop body can be clearly divided into two stages. First, it
reads the next device event if there is one. Second, it invokes the correct entry
function to process the event under the current state. After the event is processed,
the device state is still saved in s and continue to process the next device event.
To execute such a virtual device symbolically, we ﬁrst set the device reset state
as the initial state s0 of the virtual device, which is a concrete state. Then we
symbolically execute the virtual device from s0 with a sequence of symbolic device
events.
s0 Path explosion
Figure 5.2: Path Explosion Problem
Such execution can easily lead to a path explosion [13, 41] as shown in Figure 5.2
due to the following two reasons. First, the abstract model of a virtual device
shown in Figure 5.1 includes an inﬁnite loop. Second, for each loop iteration, it
introduces a new symbolic event, which means each iteration produces many new
paths. After processing a sequence of symbolic events, the number of paths increase
exponentially. Indeed as we tried this approach, it caused a path explosion only
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after processing a few symbolic device requests. Moreover, most functionalities of
the virtual device are only triggered by long, well-formed sequences of requests
from the reset state. Therefore, the above na¨ıve approach cannot generate deep
test sequences that suﬃciently cover device functionalities.
5.2.2 Concolic Test Generation Algorithm
In order to address the challenge in Section 5.2.1, we develop a concolic testing
scheme that integrates both concrete and symbolic execution. Concrete execution
is ﬁrst carried out on the virtual device and a sequence seq of concrete events
issued to the device by the driver is captured. With seq, a set of device states
can be computed on the virtual device, as shown in Figure 5.3 where solid arrows
denote concrete device execution while dashed arrows denote generated test cases.
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Figure 5.3: Concolic Test Generation using Virtual Devices
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The virtual device starts from the initial state s0 which is the state after re-
setting the device. With diﬀerent subsequences of seq, the device is triggered to
diﬀerent states, for example, with the event sequence seqk = e1, e2, ..., ek, the
device is brought to the device state sk from s0. With the set {s0, . . . , sn} of
reproducible device states, we can apply symbolic execution to each of these states
with a symbolic event. For each symbolic path explored, symbolic path constraints
are recorded and a concrete event satisfying these constraints are generated. As
shown in Figure 5.3, on state sk−1, we can generate three test cases as follows:
〈seqk−1, e′k,1〉, 〈seqk−1, e′k,2〉, 〈seqk−1, e′k,3〉
Algorithm 3 Generate Test Case (sut, seq, k)
1: P ← ∅, TC ← ∅;
2: s
V
← sut;
3: r
V
← Compose Symbolic Request ( );
4: d
V
← null;
5: e
V
← 〈rV , dV 〉;
6: P ← Symbolic Execution (s
V
, e
V
);
7: for each path p ∈ P do
8: e ← Generate Concrete Event (p);
9: tc ← 〈seqk, e〉;
10: TC ← TC ∪ {tc};
11: end for
12: return TC;
Algorithm 3 illustrates how to generate test cases. Here, P is a temporary set
for saving all constraints for each path computed by symbolic execution, and TC
saves all generated test cases tc. We set the given state sut as the state of virtual
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device s
V
, and then execute the virtual device with a symbolic request r
V
. In this
section, we do not consider DMA data and set it to null to illustrate our algorithm.
We illustrate how to handle DMA data in Section 5.2.3. For each explored path p,
we can get its symbolic path constraints. Then a concrete event e is generated for
triggering p. A test case tc consists of a request sequence seqk leading the device
to sut and the newly generated event e. For each sut, our approach generates a set
of test cases TC.
There can be a large number of subsequences {seqk} in seq. To generate test
cases from all {seqk} may entail prohibiting overheads. We allow the user to
select {seqk} via assertions on device states and events. Then a selected seqk is
replayed on virtual prototypes to get the state under test sut. After replaying a
set of selected sequences, we can obtain a set of states Sut where Sut = {sut1, sut2,
..., sutn}. To help users select states more eﬃciently, we provide an automatic
mechanism in Section 5.2.4.
5.2.3 Concolic Approach to Handling DMA Data
In order to process a device request r, a device might read/write data using DMA.
Therefore, we need to handle DMA data in the test generation process. We ﬁrst
tried a na¨ıve approach to represent DMA data with symbolic values. We replace
line 4 “d
V
← null;” with “d
V
← Make Symbolic DMA ();” in Algorithm 3 and
run the modiﬁed algorithm to generate test cases. From our experiments, we
observed that it easily causes path explosion since symbolic DMA data introduces
too many paths.
In order to make a virtual device work correctly, the DMA sequence for a
request has to follow the device speciﬁcation strictly. It is diﬃcult to generate a
whole DMA sequence using pure symbolic execution. A more promising approach
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is to modify DMA data in a captured DMA sequence, which means that most
logic of the DMA sequence is kept. Therefore, we also utilize concolic approach to
generate DMA-related test cases.
To process a concrete request rut at a concrete state sut, a concrete DMA
sequence dut is accessed. We record dut in the concrete execution of a virtual
device. According to Deﬁnition 4.5, dut = dut1, dut2, ..., dutn where duti is the ith
DMA data. The length of duti is represented as luti. Usually the type of duti is a
structure. An example is shown in Figure 5.4.
//Sample DMA data structure
struct e1000_tx_desc {
uint64 t buffer_addr; /∗ Address of the descriptor’s data buﬀer ∗/
union {
uint32 t data;
struct {
uint16 t length; /∗ Data buﬀer length ∗/
uint8 t cso; /∗ Checksum oﬀset ∗/
uint8 t cmd; /∗ Descriptor control ∗/
} flags;
} lower;
......
};
Figure 5.4: An Example of QEMU DMA Data Structure
We further abstract the organization of duti as Figure 5.5. The data duti includes
several separate sections of data, such as x, y, and z. These diﬀerent sections are
accessed individually to control the execution ﬂow of the virtual device.
To collect the information of these separate sections, we ﬁrst run the virtual
device with rut and dut from sut concretely using the execution engine. Every time
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Figure 5.5: The Abstraction of a DMA Record
the DMA data is accessed, we save the oﬀset and the length of accessed DMA data
as a DMA access record a. After we ﬁnish the execution, we collect the concrete
execution trace tr and get the set A of all saved DMA access records.
For each access record a in A, we deﬁne a concolic DMA data dcuti according
to a as shown in Figure 5.6. The concolic DMA data dcuti includes two parts,
Offset
Length
Symbolic Concrete
Figure 5.6: A Concolic DMA Example
a symbolic part and a concrete part. According to the oﬀset and the length of
accessed DMA data saved in a, we make symbolic that segment of dcuti, whose
length is luti. We further compose the DMA sequence d
c
ut by combining d
c
uti and
the rest DMA records in dut. Then we run the virtual device symbolically with
dcut and rut from sut and collect all paths explored. If only one path is explored, it
means that the symbolic part does not lead to any branch forked in the symbolic
execution. Therefore we do not generate a test case since the explored path follows
the same trace as tr . If more than one paths are explored, for each trace diﬀerent
from tr, we generate a new test case based on its path constraints and dcut.
A new algorithm as shown in Algorithm 4 is developed to generate DMA-related
test cases. In Algorithm 4, P is a temporary set for saving all constraints for each
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Algorithm 4 Generate DMA Related Test Case (sut, rut, dut, seq, k)
1: P ← ∅, A ← ∅, TCD ← ∅;
2:
3: /* Compute the concrete trace and collect DMA access records */
4: s
V
← sut;
5: e
V
← 〈rut, dut〉;
6: 〈A, tr〉 ← Concrete Execution (s
V
, e
V
);
7:
8: /* Generate DMA-related test cases */
9: for each access record a ∈ A do
10: d
V
← Make Concolic DMA (dut, a);
11: e
V
← 〈rut, dV 〉;
12: P ← Symbolic Execution (s
V
, e
V
);
13: if P.size() > 1 then
14: for each path p ∈ P do
15: if Compare Traces(p, tr) == false then
16: d ← Generate Concrete DMA (p);
17: e ← 〈rut, d〉;
18: tc ← 〈seqk, e〉;
19: TCD ← TCD ∪ {tc};
20: end if
21: end for
22: end if
23: end for
24: return TCD;
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path computed by symbolic execution, A is a temporary set for saving all the DMA
access records, and TCD saves all generated DMA-related test cases tc. We run a
virtual device in two rounds to generate DMA-related test cases.
1. Compute the concrete trace and collect all DMA access records.
We set the given state sut as the state of virtual device sV and construct the
device event e
V
using the given request rut and the DMA sequence dut. Then
we run the virtual device under s
V
with e
V
to collect the trace tr and all
DMA access records A.
2. Generate DMA-related test cases. With each DMA access record a
in A, we construct a concolic DMA data sequence d
V
. With d
V
and the
concrete request rut, the virtual device is executed from sV symbolically. All
explored paths P are collected. We ﬁrst determine whether P has more than
one path. If it has, we compare the trace of each explored path p with tr.
Then a concrete DMA sequence d is generated for triggering p if the trace
of p is diﬀerent from tr. A test case tc consists of a request sequence seqk
leading the device to sut and the event 〈rut, d〉.
To generate practical DMA data in the symbolic execution process, we also
follow two rules. In the DMA-related test generation process, a DMA sequence
is necessary for a newly explored path p. We denote such a sequence as d =
d1, d2, ..., dm where di is the ith DMA data. We further denote the length of di as
li. Two rules as follows are deﬁned to guide test generation to generate well-formed
DMA data.
Rule 1: If li is not equal to luti, p is discarded.
Rule 2: If m is larger than n, p is discarded.
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In the test generation process, the length of a DMA record and the number of
DMA records in a DMA sequence should be the same as the corresponding length
and number of the concrete DMA data captured at runtime strictly. If there is
any diﬀerence, which means there is a rule violation, the behavior of the virtual
device can be very diﬀerent from the concrete execution. Such kind of generated
test cases are too random to trust. Our proposed rules can well eliminate these
random tests.
In order to generate request-related test cases with DMA data, we extend
our test case generation algorithm shown in Algorithm 3 to Algorithm 5. The
extension is to use a captured or generated DMA sequence dut that is not null and
well-formed.
Algorithm 5 Generate Request Related Test Case (sut, dut, seq, k)
1: P ← ∅, TCR ← ∅;
2: s
V
← sut;
3: r
V
← Compose Symbolic Request ( );
4: e
V
← 〈rV , dut〉;
5: P ← Symbolic Execution (s
V
, e
V
);
6: for each path p ∈ P do
7: r ← Generate Concrete Request (p);
8: e ← 〈r, dut〉;
9: tc ← 〈seqk, e〉;
10: TCR ← TCR ∪ {tc};
11: end for
12: return TCR;
In Algorithm 5, we execute the virtual device with a symbolic request r
V
and
concrete DMA data dut from sut. If dut is null in the concrete execution of the
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virtual device, Algorithm 5 is the same as Algorithm 3. If dut is not null, we run a
virtual device symbolically with a symbolic request r
V
and dut from sut. The above
two rules has been used in generating well-formed DMA data. They are further
extended to eliminate generated requests that have DMA data ill-formed for such
types of requests.
To generate request-related test cases, we not only can utilize the captured
DMA sequence, but also can utilize the DMA sequences that are generated using
Algorithm 4. More implementation details about utilizing DMA data are discussed
in Section 3.3.3.
5.2.4 Transaction-based Test Selection Strategy
In order to make our concolic testing approach practical and eﬃcient, we need to
address the following two key challenges:
• State selection problem. For a virtual device, we can get a vast number of
states under test by replaying a long sequence of device events. Applying
test generation to all these states is impractical. How to select states under
test is a critical challenge. Even if we allow users to select states with ﬁlters,
it can still be a laborious process.
• Test case redundancy problem. Even if we only generate test cases on states
selected, we can still get a large number of test cases. Applying all such test
cases on a silicon device takes much time. However, certain test cases trigger
the same behavior on a silicon device, i.e., they cover the same transaction.
Therefore, to improve eﬃciency, such redundant test cases should be clearly
identiﬁed.
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We develop a transaction-based test selection strategy to address the above two
challenges. First, states under test are selected based on device transactions. To
select states, we replay a sequence seq of device events on the virtual device. For
each state transition si
ri+1
=⇒ si+1, we compute the corresponding transaction. If a
new transaction t is found, we select si as a state under test. Based on analyzing
virtual device executions in virtual machines, we observed that such states have
good chances of triggering new transactions with diﬀerent requests.
Algorithm 6 Select States Under Test (seq)
1: StateIndices ← ∅, T ← ∅;
2: i ← 0; //loop iteration
3: s0 ← Reset Device ();
4: while i < seq.size do
5: ei+1 ← Get Event (seq, i+ 1);
6: si+1 ← Compute Next State (si, ei+1);
7: t ← Compute Transaction (si, ei+1);
8: if t /∈ T then
9: T ← T ∪ {t};
10: StateIndices ← StateIndices ∪ {i+ 1};
11: end if
12: i ← i+ 1;
13: end while
14: return StateIndices;
Algorithm 6 illustrates how to select states under test in detail. StateIndices
is a temporary set for saving indices of all selected states, and T saves all unique
transactions invoked. We set the state after resetting the device as the initial state
s0. Then we run the virtual device with each event in the event sequence seq. After
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that, we compute the next state and the transaction by processing the event under
the current state. For each event, if there is a new transaction t found, we save it
in T and save the corresponding state index in StateIndices. After all events are
executed, we get a set of state indices. The corresponding states are the selected
states under test.
Second, we apply transaction-based test selection strategy to identify redundant
test cases. In the process of selecting states as discussed above, we can get a set of
unique transactions T . The set T can be further utilized to identify redundant test
cases. When we conduct test generation, every time a transaction t is explored by
symbolic execution, we determine whether it is a new transaction that is not in T .
If it is new, the corresponding test case is saved and t is added into T . Otherwise,
we save the test case as a redundant test case so that the user can utilize this test
case if time permits.
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION
5.3.1 ACTG Framework
As illustrated in Figure 6.3, our automatic conconlic test generation (ACTG)
framework includes three key components:
Test
Manager
Operating System
Virtual Machine
Test Suite
Recorder
Virtual
Prototype
Execution Harness
Symbolic Engine
Virtual
Prototype
Operating System
Physical Machine
Silicon
Device
Generated
Test Cases
Request
Sequence
Figure 5.7: Automatic Concolic Test Generation Framework
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• Device Request Recorder. The recorder captures device requests and DMA
data from a concrete execution of the virtual device in the virtual machine.
Any user or kernel level test case may be issued in the guest OS. The request
recorder fully hooks the virtual device entries and DMA functions so that
all device requests and DMA data are intercepted and recorded in the event
sequence seq.
• Symbolic Execution Engine. The symbolic execution engine replays a subse-
quence seqk of seq to trigger the desired state under test sut. Then the engine
is used in two ways. First, the engine symbolically execute the virtual device
from sut with the corresponding concrete request rc and symbolic DMA data
along the corresponding concrete trace. For each branch condition collected,
a concrete DMA sequence d is generated. A new test case tc is composed of
seqk and 〈rc, d〉. Second, the engine symbolically executes the virtual device
from sut with a symbolic request. Among the transactions explored, a trans-
action of interest is selected, its symbolic path constraints are recorded and
a concrete device request r satisfying the constraints is generated. A new
test case tc is composed of the request sequence seqk and the pair of newly
generated request and the DMA sequence 〈r, d〉.
• Test Manager. The test manager is a kernel-level software module residing
on the test machine with the silicon device. It applies a test case to the
silicon device by issuing the sequence of events included in the test case.
5.3.2 Testing with Generated Test Cases
After generating test cases, our approach can then apply a generated test case to
both real and virtual devices.
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Application of test cases
A real (or virtual, respectively) device interacts with the high-level software in a
real (or virtual) machine, on which a test case tc can be applied using Algorithm 7.
In order to apply tc, we ﬁrst reset both real and virtual devices so that we can keep
Algorithm 7 Apply Test Cases (TC)
1: for each tc ∈ TC do
2: i ← 0; //loop iteration
3: num ← number of requests in tc;
4: s
R,0
← Reset Real Device ();
5: s
V,0
← Reset V irtual Device ();
6: while i < num do
7: ei+1 ← Get Event (tc, i+ 1);
8: s
R,i+1
← Compute Next State (s
R,i
, ei+1);
9: s
V,i+1
← Compute Next State (s
V,i
, ei+1);
10: Check State (s
R,i+1
, s
V,i+1
);
11: i ← i+ 1;
12: end while
13: end for
their initial states consistent. Our approach employs a test manager (a kernel-level
module) to issue a tc in both real and virtual machines. Then we capture concrete
states of both real and virtual devices after applying a tc. For a real device, it
is diﬃcult to capture the internal state. Hence, we only capture the interface
state for the real device. Finally, we conduct consistency checks on the captured
states between silicon devices and virtual prototypes. Our approach compares
interface states of the real and virtual devices to detect any inconsistency. Such
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an inconsistency often indicates divergence between real and virtual device states,
reﬂecting an error in either the real or virtual device.
Test case replay on virtual devices
Upon detecting an inconsistency or a hardware error, the triggering test case can be
replayed on the virtual device so that the user can better understand the exercised
transaction. The symbolic engine is employed for replaying a test case tc = 〈seq, e〉.
The engine ﬁrst brings the device to the state under test sut and then replay the
event e from sut. The engine follows the same code path that it followed while
generating e, since e is generated by instantiating symbolic variables to concrete
values that satisfy the constraints of that path.
The power of the symbolic engine enables full controllability and observability
while replaying a test case. The symbolic engine is also suﬃciently responsive to
support interactive replay. It enables the user to navigate backward and forward,
step by step through the execution path induced by a concrete test case. Our
approach can help the user better observe what variables are changed where along
the path, what inputs and initial state trigger the path, and inspect values of
variables at any step.
5.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
QEMU includes many virtual devices, which provides a broad range of test cases
for our approach. We apply ACTG to virtual devices for three popular network
adapters as shown in Table 5.1. While our tool currently focuses on QEMU-based
virtual devices, the principles also apply to other virtual prototypes.
To execute virtual devices symbolically, we manually created a simple harness
for each virtual device. We also created a common library of stub functions for all
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Table 5.1: Virtual Prototypes for Three Network Adapters
Vendor Descriptions
E1000 Intel Pro/1000 Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
Tigon3 Broadcom BCM57xx-based Gigabit Ethernet Adapter
EEPro100 Intel Pro/100 Ethernet Adapter
three virtual devices. The stub library has 481 lines of C code. More details about
device models and their harnesses are given in Table 5.2. All device models are
non-trivial in size ranging from 2099 lines to 4648 lines. All harnesses are relatively
easy to create, having about 100 lines only. Only several hours are needed to create
and ﬁne-tune each harness and the stub library.
Table 5.2: Summary of Three Virtual Prototypes
Virtual Prototype Harness
Lines Functions Lines Entry Functions
E1000 2099 53 74 4
Tigon3 4648 34 80 4
EEPro100 2178 70 85 7
In order to evaluate our approach, we capture a request sequence triggered by
a test suite from concrete executions of virtual devices in QEMU. The test suite
includes common network testing programs. As shown in Table 5.3, we give a
partial list of programs in the test suite due to space limitation. For each virtual
prototype, we have applied this test suite.
The experiments were performed on a desktop with an 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R)
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Table 5.3: Summary of Test Suite
Category Commands Descriptions
Driver Load/Unload
insmod Load driver module
rmmod Remove driver module
Basic Programs
ifup Bring a network interface up
ifdown Take a network interface down
ifconﬁg Conﬁgure a network interface
ping Send ICMP ECHO REQUEST
scp Copy ﬁles between network hosts
Extra Programs
ethtool
Query or control network driver
and hardware settings
scapy Manipulate network packets
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X3470 CPU, 8 GB of RAM, 250GB and 7200RPM IDE disk drive and running the
Ubuntu Linux OS with 64-bit kernel version 3.0.61.
5.4.1 Evaluation of Transaction-based Test Selection Strategy
We have applied transaction-based test selection strategy to select states and e-
liminate test case redundancy.
State selection
As shown in Table 5.4, we captured a large number of requests in the request
sequence triggered by our test suite, for example, 64,836 requests for the E1000
virtual device. With our transaction-based test selection strategy, only a small
number of states are selected, for instance, 60 states for the E1000 virtual device.
In order to evaluate the eﬃciency of our test selection strategy, we compare it
with the random strategy. With the random strategy, we select states under test
randomly. Here, we select two sets of states with the random strategy. It can be
observed from Table 5.4 that with the same number of states under test selected,
our strategy can generate many more useful tests, i.e., tests triggering distinctive
device transactions.
Table 5.4: Comparison of Diﬀerent Strategies
Requests Transaction Strategy Random Strategy
in Trace States Tests States Tests States Tests
E1000 64836 60 774 60 48 180 60
Tigon3 19157 52 175 52 46 156 54
EEPro100 41849 54 357 54 116 162 116
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To further evaluate the eﬃciency of our approach, we evaluate the time usages
of the transaction-based selection strategy as shown in Table 5.5. This strategy
requires spending time on both selecting states and generating test cases. The
overall time for E1000 is 30 minutes which includes 3.5 minutes for state selection
and 26.5 minutes for test generation.
Table 5.5: Time Usage of Transaction-based Selection Strategy
States
Time (Minutes)
Selection Generation Overall Average
E1000 60 3.5 26.5 30 0.5
Tigon3 52 2 17 19 0.4
EEPro100 54 2 91 93 1.7
Moreover, we applied test generation to 6000 states of the E1000 virtual device
selected using the random strategy. It takes 1 day, however only two new test cases
are generated. If we were to apply test generation on all 64836 states, it would
have taken 10 days. Through the experiment, we made two observations. First, it
is not cost-eﬀective to apply test generation to all captured virtual device states.
Second, our transaction-based strategy is eﬃcient. It brings order-of-magnitude
reduction on time usage and eﬀective and only misses a few tests found with much
higher time usage.
Test case redundancy identiﬁcation
As shown in Figure 5.8, our transaction-based strategy is very eﬀective in identify-
ing redundant tests. For each virtual device, we have achieved order-of-magnitude
reduction in the number of tests that need to be applied to the virtual device in
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order to cover the same set of transactions. The extra tests are not thrown away
and are also applied in device testing when time permits.
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Figure 5.8: Number of Generated Tests
5.4.2 Composition of Generated Tests
We generate both DMA-related and request-related test cases. Figure 5.9 shows
the number of generated DMA-related and request-related test cases on Tigon3.
For Tigon3, we generate 175 test cases, 99 test cases of which are request-related
test cases and 76 test cases are DMA-related test cases.
76, 43%
99, 57%
DMA-related
Request-related
Figure 5.9: Number of Generated DMA-related and Request-related Tests
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5.4.3 Evaluation of Optimization on Sparse Function Pointer Array
We present optimization results for common sparse arrays existing in a virtual
device. These sparse arrays can be divided into two categories. One kind of array,
denoted as Aw, includes all interface register functions for handling register-write
operation; the other kind of array, denoted as Ar, includes all interface register
functions for handling register-read operation.
To evaluate the sparse function pointer array optimization, we compare the
number of branches forked as shown in Table 5.6. We did not conduct the evalu-
ation on EEPro100 because EEPro100 is an old virtual device which uses several
“switch-case” structures rather than the sparse function pointer array. As shown
in Table 5.6, we get signiﬁcant improvements using the optimization.
Table 5.6: Number of Branches Forked
Aw Ar
Without Opt. With Opt. Without Opt. With Opt.
E1000 5845 13 5845 7
Tigon3 28705 13 2233 2
*Opt.: Optimization
5.4.4 Coverage Improvement
To measure the quality of generated tests, we evaluate the coverage results. We
utilize test coverage over the virtual device to estimate the functional coverage over
the silicon device. Because the virtual device is software, we utilize four diﬀerent
code coverage metrics to measure the coverage improvement.
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Table 5.7: Summary of Coverage Improvement
Statement Block
#
Test Suite Generated Tests
#
Test Suite Generated Tests
# % # % # % # %
E1000 3256 2602 79.91% 2835 87.07% 298 214 71.81% 252 84.56%
Tigon3 1791 1496 83.53% 1689 94.3% 138 104 75.36% 128 92.75%
EEPro100 2369 1767 74.59% 2089 88.18% 266 170 63.91% 222 83.46%
Function Branch
#
Test Suite Generated Tests
#
Test Suite Generated Tests
# % # % # % # %
E1000 42 39 92.86% 42 100% 264 165 62.5% 210 79.55%
Tigon3 25 23 92% 25 100% 120 70 46.67% 97 80.83%
EEPro100 44 39 88.64% 42 95.45% 150 77 51.33% 115 76.67%
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As shown in Table 6.5, the generated test cases improve test coverage signif-
icantly. Although the test suite we use has already been able to get reasonable
coverage on three virtual devices, the coverage can still be signiﬁcantly improved
using our generated test cases. Particularly, for E1000 and Tigon3, the function
coverage can be improved to 100%. For Tigon3 and EEPro100, the branch coverage
can be improved by more than 25%.
5.4.5 Inconsistencies
As we apply the test cases on virtual and silicon devices, we collect both virtual and
silicon device states. We then conduct consistency checking between the virtual
and silicon device states. Our test cases have uncovered several inconsistencies
between the real devices and their virtual devices. In our study, even though all
the devices are popular devices which have gone through years of thorough testing
and their virtual devices are created after fact, we still detected inconsistencies.
The inconsistencies detected by our test suite and generated test cases are shown
in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Number of Inconsistencies Detected by Test Suite and Generated
Tests
One common inconsistency caused by virtual devices is that after certain special
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requests, one or several device registers are modiﬁed in silicon devices while in
virtual devices, they are unchanged. This inconsistency was introduced assuming
the drivers would well behave and not issue such special requests. Two types of
inconsistencies detected are caused by silicon devices: (1) devices are not initialized
properly according to device speciﬁcations and (2) devices update registers that are
speciﬁed as reserved in the device speciﬁcations. We believe that if such tests are
conducted on a newly designed silicon device prototype, our approach can discover
more silicon device bugs.
5.5 FAULT INJECTIONWITH VIRTUAL PROTOTYPES FOR DRIV-
ER TESTING
Virtual devices are software components. Compared to their hardware counter-
parts, it is easier to achieve controllability on virtual prototypes. This makes
virtual prototypes amenable to device fault injection for driver testing.
Based on ACTG framework and runtime shadow execution in Section 3.4, we
further develop an approach to generation and injection of virtual prototype-based
faults for driver testing. We ﬁrst collect unique transactions to identify diﬀerent
device behaviors, such as register writes and interrupt ﬁring, from concrete execu-
tions of a virtual prototype, and then modify these device behaviors to generate
fault scenarios. We then employ runtime shadow execution to apply the gener-
ated fault scenarios to virtual prototypes at runtime to guide fault simulation to
test whether device drivers can handle these faulty behaviors correctly. We have
applied this approach to virtual prototypes of three network adaptors to generate
fault scenarios. The generated faults have been applied at runtime to test driver
reliability.
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5.5.1 Fault Models
Before discussing the details of transaction-based fault injection, we ﬁrst introduce
two fault models:
• I/O error model. Device drivers issue requests to control and operate devices.
However, these I/O requests can be lost, corrupted and bit-ﬂipped [37, 77]
due to electrical interference, bus errors and ﬁrmware failures. In our ap-
proach, we modeled two kinds of I/O faults: I/O request loss and bit-ﬂipping.
• Interrupt loss model. Devices ﬁre interrupts to notify drivers when some
special events happen in the hardware. However, interrupt loss happens
because of hardware failures and bus errors [37]. In our approach, we generate
faults to model interrupt loss as one kind of incorrect device behaviors.
Furthermore, we generate fault scenarios for each fault model in two categories:
• Transient Fault. A transient fault occurs once and then disappears. In our
approach, we model transient fault by simulating a fault once in one iteration
of fault injection.
• Permanent Fault. A permanent fault is a fault that always present. In our
approach, we model permanent fault by simulating a fault persistently in one
iteration of fault injection.
5.5.2 Transaction-based Fault Generation
To simulate incorrect device behavior, one na¨ıve idea is to inject faults randomly.
However, there are two disadvantages with the random approach. First, incorrect
device behaviors usually do not happen randomly. Second, random testing is
ineﬃcient. How to generate hardware-related and eﬀective fault scenarios is very
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challenging. We further extend ACTG to generate practical and eﬃcient fault
scenarios.
Algorithm 8 Transaction-based Fault Generation (seq)
1: FaultScenarios ← ∅, TA ← ∅;
2: i ← 0; //loop iteration
3: s0 ← Reset Device ();
4: while i < seq.size do
5: ei+1 ← Get Event (seq, i+ 1);
6: si+1 ← Compute Next State (si, ei+1);
7: t ← Compute Transaction (si, ei+1);
8: addr ← Get Request Address (ei+1);
9: ta ← 〈t, addr〉;
10: if ta /∈ TA then
11: TA ← TA ∪ ta;
12: FaultScenarios ← Generate Faults (ta);
13: end if
14: i ← i+ 1;
15: end while
16: return FaultScenarios;
We ﬁrst capture device requests and DMA data as a request sequence seq from
a concrete execution of the virtual device in the virtual machine. We then employ
a symbolic execution engine to replay all captured requests and generate fault
scenarios using a transaction-based strategy. In the generation process, we ﬁrst
identify the transaction for each state transition and then use the transaction and
I/O request address together as identiﬁers to decide whether we generate fault
scenarios.
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Algorithm 8 illustrates how to generate fault scenarios. FaultScenarios is a
temporary set for saving all generated fault scenarios, and TA saves all unique pairs
of transaction and I/O request address invoked. We set the state after resetting
the device as the initial state s0. Then we run the virtual device with each event in
the event sequence seq. After that, we compute the next state and the transaction
by processing the event under the current state. For each event, if there is a new
pair ta found, we save it in TA. Based on ta, fault scenarios are generated using
fault models and saved in FaultScenarios. After all events are executed, we get
a set of fault scenarios.
5.5.3 Fault Injection Using Runtime Shadow Execution
To apply fault scenarios, we need to detect device transaction at runtime. We
employ runtime shadow execution introduced in Section 3.4 to achieve this.
Fault Injector ShadowExecution Engine
Device Driver
Virtual Prototype
Fault
Scenario
Test Suite
I/O request
I/O request
Interrupt
Interrupt
I/O request
Transaction
Injection Interface for Interrupt loss
Injection Interface for I/O error
Injection Interface for Bit-flipping
Figure 5.11: Fault Injection Framework Using Runtime Shadow Execution
Figure 5.11 shows the fault injection framework using runtime shadow execu-
tion. To apply one fault scenario, we load the fault scenario into the fault injector
and then run a test suite to test device drivers. The fault injector captures each
I/O request issued by the device driver, and then send I/O request information to
shadow execution engine to compute the corresponding transaction. If the pair of
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transaction and request address matches ta in the fault scenario, the corresponding
fault model will be applied.
• I/O request loss fault (I/Om). To inject an I/O request loss fault, the fault
injector does not send the I/O request to the virtual prototype and return
directly. This fault is injected into the I/O request interface between the
driver and the fault injector.
• I/O request bit-ﬂipping fault (I/Obf). To inject an I/O request bit-ﬂipping
fault, the fault injector ﬂips one bit of the I/O request following the fault
scenario and sends the I/O request to the virtual prototype. This fault is
injected into the I/O request interface between the fault injector and the
virtual prototype.
• Interrupt loss fault (Intrm). To inject an interrupt loss fault, the fault injec-
tor sends I/O requests to the virtual prototype and breaks the interrupt ﬁred
by the virtual prototype. This fault is injected into the interrupt interface
between the driver and the fault injector.
5.5.4 Preliminary Evaluation
Using the same experimental setup in Section 5.4, we have applied our approach
to virtual devices for three popular network adapters: E1000, E100 and TG3.
As shown in Table 5.8, we have generated about 1500 fault scenarios for E1000,
about 200 for E100 and 2460 for TG3. All generation processes only take about
or less than one minute. The fault injection process for each driver takes several
hours. After applying all fault scenarios for three drivers, several unique warnings
are triggered and 2 bugs are found on TG3 driver. Since both E1000 and E100
drivers have existed for more than 15 years, it is highly possible that E1000 and
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Table 5.8: Preliminary Result of Fault Injection with Virtual Prototypes
Driver
# of faults Time(Minutes)
# of Unique Warnings # of Crashes
I/Om I/Obf Intrm All Generation Injection All
E1000 832 674 16 1522 0.5 228.5 229 6 0
E100 100 86 6 192 1 124 125 2 0
TG3 2246 212 2 2460 0.5 620 620.5 4 2
E100 drivers can handle all kinds of device errors and not crashed. For TG3
driver, two crashes are triggered by two diﬀerent fault scenarios. One is to inject
an I/O write request loss fault, the other is to inject an I/O read request loss fault.
Both faults can lead to system crashes because there is no desired device behavior
happening or no correct return value.
5.6 RELATED WORK
5.6.1 Symbolic execution
There has been much recent work on using symbolic execution to automatically
generate test inputs, leading to software testing tools such as Java PathFinder [78],
CUTE and jCUTE [73], CREST [9], BitBlaze [11], DART [30], and SAGE [32].
These tools basically follow the same approach as KLEE in solving a path’s con-
straints to generate a test case and diﬀer in the speciﬁcs of symbolic execution
and test case generation. However, symbolic execution has a major limitation,
a.k.a., path explosion. To execute a complex program symbolically, the number of
feasible paths can be exponential. Furthermore, it can even be inﬁnite in the case
of programs with unbounded loop iterations [6, 52, 76].
In our approach, we applied symbolic execution to a special type of programs,
80
virtual devices, utilized characteristics of virtual devices to improve symbolic ex-
ecution eﬀectiveness, generated test cases characterizing paths (i.e., transactions)
through virtual devices, and provided facilities for applying the tests to real devices
and replaying the tests on virtual devices to assist debugging.
5.6.2 Concolic testing
Concolic testing [30, 32, 73, 81], combining concrete and symbolic execution, is a
hybrid software testing technique that performs symbolic execution along a con-
crete execution path. Concolic testing collects all path constraints along the con-
crete path. The path constraints are then used to incrementally generate test
inputs by conjoining path constraints for a preﬁx of the path with the negation
of a conditional taken by the execution [53]. Since the algorithm does concrete
executions, all bugs inferred by the technique are real [65].
Our approach shares the general spirit of concolic testing; however, concol-
ic execution of virtual prototypes diﬀer signiﬁcantly from previous approaches to
concolic execution of software programs. In our approach, we ﬁrst compute con-
crete device states by executing virtual prototypes with captured concrete runtime
data. Then, we generate tests with concrete device states and symbolic device
inputs using symbolic execution. Our approach not only integrates concrete and
symbolic execution, but also combines virtual and silicon device executions.
5.6.3 Post-silicon validation
Post-silicon validation has become a bottleneck in system development cycle and
is a signiﬁcant, growing part of overall validation cost [38]. There has been much
research on post-silicon validation to reduce costs and improve observability [22,
33, 40, 51, 63, 79]. However, many challenges remain in post-silicon validation,
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such as coverage metrics, failure reproduction, and test generation [57].
One approach to post-silicon test generation is Automatic Test Pattern Gener-
ation (ATPG) [24, 48], which targets exposing electrical and manufacturing defects
rather than functional errors. Another approach is built-in self-test (BIST) [47, 80].
BIST is a mechanism that permits a device to test itself, which also mainly targets
manufacturing defects. There has also been eﬀorts on reusing pre-silicon valida-
tion tests in post-silicon validation [2, 60]. Our approach shares the same goal of
bridging the gap between pre-silicon and post-silicon validation, while fully lever-
aging the white box nature of virtual prototypes to eﬃciently generate high-quality
functional tests.
5.7 SUMMARY
This chapter presented an automatic concolic approach to generation of post-silicon
tests with virtual prototypes. The generated test cases have been further issued to
both virtual prototypes and silicon devices to evaluate coverage and check incon-
sistencies. We have obtained signiﬁcant improvement in test coverage and detected
20 inconsistencies between virtual prototypes and silicon devices.
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Chapter 6
AUTOMATIC DRIVER FAULT INJECTION
6.1 MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
Robustness testing is a crucial stage in the device driver development cycle. Device
drivers may behave correctly in normal system environments, but fail to handle
corner cases when experiencing system errors, such as low resource situations, PCI
bus errors and DMA failures [74]. Therefore, it is critical to conduct such robust-
ness testing to improve driver reliability. However, such corner cases are usually
diﬃcult to trigger when testing drivers. The time-to-market pressure further exac-
erbates the problem by limiting the time allocated for driver testing [72]. Thus, it
is highly desirable to speed-up driver robustness testing and reduce human eﬀort.
Fault injection is a technique for software robustness testing by introducing
faults to test code paths, in particular error handling code paths, that might oth-
erwise rarely be traversed. Recently, fault injection techniques have been widely
used for software testing [56, 61]. These techniques have major potential to play
a crucial role in driver robustness testing.
In Section 5.5, we have illustrated how to conduct device fault injection for
driver robustness testing. We have developed two hardware fault models to guide
fault injection with virtual prototypes for driver testing. Device drivers not only
interact with hardware devices, but also need kernel API support to access system
resource. We have proposed a systematic fault injection approach targeting at
kernel API interfaces for driver robustness testing in this chapter.
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Our approach is inspired by Linux Fault Injection Infrastructure (LFII) [49]
which has been integrated into the Linux kernel since Version 2.6.19. LFII can
cause system faults, such as memory allocation functions returning errors, for
system robustness testing. Our concept of faults is consistent with that of LFII.
There are also other similar studies focusing on fault injection techniques for driver
robustness testing [67, 83]. However, these approaches and tools have obvious
limitations. First, they only provide basic frameworks which mainly support low
memory situations. Second, they only support random fault injection which is
hard to control and ineﬃcient. Third, they require much human eﬀort and time to
get good results and are not easy-to-use. This demands an innovative approach to
systematic and eﬀective fault generation and injection for driver robustness testing.
This chapter presents an approach to automatic runtime fault generation and
injection for driver robustness testing. Our approach runs a driver test and collects
the corresponding runtime trace. Then we identify target functions which can fail
from the captured trace, and generate eﬀective fault scenarios on these target
functions. Each generated fault scenario includes a fault conﬁguration which is
applied to guide further fault injection. Each fault scenario is applied to guide
one instance of runtime fault injection and generate further fault scenarios. This
process is repeated until all fault scenarios have been tested. To achieve systematic
and eﬀective fault injection, we have developed two key strategies. First, a bounded
trace-based iterative generation strategy is developed for generating eﬀective fault
scenarios. Second, a permutation-based injection strategy is developed to assure
the ﬁdelity of runtime fault injection.
We have implemented our approach in a prototype driver robustness testing
tool, namely, ADFI (Automatic Driver Fault Injection). ADFI has been applied
to 12 widely-used device drivers. ADFI generated thousands of fault scenarios and
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injected them at runtime automatically. After applying all these generated fault
scenarios to driver testing, ADFI detected 28 severe driver bugs. Among these
bugs, 8 bugs are caused by low resource situations, 8 bugs are caused by PCI bus
errors, 8 bugs are caused by DMA failures and the other 4 bugs are caused by
mixed situations.
Our research makes the following three key contributions:
1)Automatic Fault Injection. Our approach to driver robustness testing
not only enables runtime fault injection to simulate system errors, but also gener-
ates fault scenarios automatically based on the runtime trace to exercise possible
error conditions of a driver eﬃciently. Our approach is easy to use and requires
minimum manual eﬀorts, which greatly reduces driver testing costs and accelerates
testing process.
2)Bounded Trace-based Iterative Generation Strategy. A bounded
trace-based iterative generation strategy is developed to generate unique and ef-
fective fault scenarios based on runtime traces. This strategy not only generates
eﬀective fault scenarios covering diﬀerent kinds of error situations in modest time,
but also produces eﬃcient fault scenarios with no redundancy.
3)Permutation-based Replay Mechanism. To assure the ﬁdelity of run-
time fault injection with generated fault scenarios, a permutation-based replay
mechanism is developed to handle software concurrency and runtime uncertainty.
The mechanism guarantees that the same driver behaviors can be triggered using
the same fault scenario repeatedly at runtime.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present
the design of our approach. Section 4 discusses its implementation. Section 5
elaborates on the case studies we have conducted and discusses the experimental
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results. Section 6 reviews related work. Section 7 concludes our work.
6.2 BOUNDED TRACE-BASED ITERATIVE FAULT GENERATION
6.2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
To help better understand our approach, we ﬁrst introduce several deﬁnitions and
illustrate them with examples.
Deﬁnition 1 (target function): A target function f˜ is a kernel API function
which can fail and return an error when f˜ is invoked by a device driver.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the function kmalloc is a target function since it can
fail and return a null pointer.
A stack trace records a sequence of function call frames at a certain point during
the execution of a program which allows tracking the sequence of nested functions
called [82].
Deﬁnition 2 (target stack trace): A target stack trace τ  f1 → f2 → ...→
fn → f˜ of a driver consists of a sequence of driver functions and a target function
f˜ . The sequence of driver functions are called prior to f˜ along a driver path. The
ﬁrst function f1 is a driver entry function.
A target stack trace τ records what happened before a target function was
invoked. Once a driver/system crash happens, the target stack trace can help
the developer better understand the driver behavior. The same target functions
can appear in diﬀerent target stack traces since the same target functions can be
invoked along diﬀerent driver paths.
As shown in Figure 6.1, when driver entry functions Entry A and Entry B
are invoked during driver execution, there are three possible target stack traces τ1,
τ2 and τ3 shown in Figure 6.2.
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void Entry_A() { //Driver entry function
......
ret = Target_Function_1();
if(!ret) goto error;
Function_X();
......
}
void Function_X() {
......
ret = Target_Function_2();
......
}
void Entry_B() { //Driver entry function
......
ret = Target_Function_3();
......
}
Figure 6.1: A Driver Function Call Example
τ1:
τ2:
τ3:
Function_XEntry_A
Target_Function_1
ntry_BE
Entry_A
Target_Function_2
arget_Function_3T
Figure 6.2: Target Stack Trace Examples
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Deﬁnition 3 (runtime trace): A runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 → ...→ τn is a
sequence of target stack traces. A subsequence εk of ε contains the ﬁrst k target
stack traces of ε where εk  τ1 → τ2 → ... → τk. A runtime trace records all target
stack traces during a driver life cycle.
A runtime trace example is shown in Figure 6.2 which is ε  τ1 → τ2 → τ3.
Deﬁnition 4 (fault conﬁguration): A fault conﬁguration φ  ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn
is a sequence of boolean variables. Each boolean variable ϕi (T or F ) is used for
deciding whether the corresponding target function f˜ of τi invokes the kernel API
or returns error. A subsequence of φk of φ contains the ﬁrst k boolean variables of
φ where φk  ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ..., ϕk.
Deﬁnition 5 (fault scenario): A fault scenario σ  〈ε, φ〉 is a pair of ε and φ.
A fault scenario is used to guide an instance of runtime fault injection.
Suppose we capture a runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 and execution statuses T, T of
both target fault functions in τ1 and τ2, then one generated fault scenario example
is σ  〈ε, φ〉 where ε  τ1 → τ2 and φ  T, F .
Deﬁnition 7 (fault scenario database): A fault scenario
database Σ  {〈σ, ς〉 — σ is a fault scenario, ς is the fault simulation result of σ}
is a set which saves all unique fault scenarios and their runtime execution results.
We have deﬁned three diﬀerent kinds of test results: pass, fail and null. Before
σ is applied, ς is null. When the driver handles the fault scenario correctly, ς is
pass. If the system or the driver crashes during the fault simulation, ς is fail and
the corresponding crash report is saved for developers to conduct further analysis.
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Figure 6.3: The High-level Workﬂow
6.2.2 Challenges
The high-level workﬂow of our approach is illustrated in Figure 6.3. ADFI ﬁrst
runs a test suite on a device driver under an empty scenario Fault0 to capture
the runtime trace where Fault0 includes an empty conﬁguration which does not
introduce any runtime fault, and fault scenarios are generated based on the cap-
tured trace. Then given one fault scenario FaultX, ADFI runs the test to see if
FaultX triggers a crash. The process of applying one fault scenario is one instance
of runtime fault injection. In one instance, ADFI hooks all target function calls.
Each time a target function call is captured, ADFI decides to execute the corre-
sponding target function or inject a fault (return a false result) according to the
fault scenario. Simultaneously, ADFI collects the trace executed during this run.
Next, ADFI generates more fault scenarios based on the trace. The above process
is repeated until all fault scenarios are applied.
The approach described above has two major challenges.
Fault scenario explosion: Generating all feasible fault scenarios does not
scale if a large number of target functions exist in a driver. A na¨ıve approach
to generating fault scenarios is to explore all target function combinations along
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a driver runtime trace ε. If there are N target functions along ε, the number of
generated fault scenarios can be 2N − 1. If we apply all these fault scenarios to
driver robustness testing, it can take much time or even forever. Indeed as we
tried this approach, it caused a fault scenario explosion after applying a few fault
scenarios.
Handling concurrency and runtime uncertainty: ADFI repeatedly runs
the same test suite and applies diﬀerent fault scenarios to guide runtime fault
injection. A fault scenario σ is a pair of a reference runtime trace ε and a fault
conﬁguration φ. To apply σ, ADFI captures a new runtime trace εnew and run
each target function εnew.τi.f˜ according to φ. Due to system concurrency and
runtime uncertainty, ε and εnew can be diﬀerent which brings diﬃculty to ﬁnd the
right φ.ϕi to guide fault injection. This demands a systematic replay mechanism
to guarantee that εnew conforms to ε upon a given fault conﬁguration φ.
6.2.3 Trace-based Iterative Strategy
In order to address the fault scenario explosion challenge, we have developed a
bounded trace-based iterative generation strategy. For each fault scenario σ, ADFI
runs the test suite on the driver and captures the runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 →
...→ τn. In the following, we set n to 3 to illustrate our approach. Although we
use a small number as the example, the idea can be applied to any large number.
As shown in Figure 6.4(a), we capture a runtime trace which includes three stack
traces and the corresponding execution statuses of target functions in three stack
traces: (T, T, T ).
By applying the na¨ıve approach, we can generate seven (23−1) fault scenarios.
However, some generated fault scenarios are invalid fault scenarios which are not
feasible at runtime. For example, if a generated fault conﬁguration φ  (T, F )
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is applied, the actual trace is τ1 → τ2 → τ4 shown in Figure 6.4(c) which is
diﬀerent from τ1 → τ2 → τ3. In this case, (T, F, F ) would be an invalid fault
conﬁguration for the trace τ1 → τ2 → τ3. In order to avoid generating invalid
fault scenarios, our trace-based iterative generation strategy only generates one-
step fault conﬁgurations (F ), (T, F ) and (T, T, F ) in this iteration as shown in
Figure 6.4(b).
Remark: Our approach does not miss any valid fault scenarios. If the driver
works as shown in Figure 6.4(a), our trace-based iterative generation strategy
ﬁrst generates three fault scenarios. Then after the fault scenario including the
conﬁguration (F ) is applied, the captured fault trace should be (F, T, T ) and we
can generate new fault conﬁgurations (F, F ) and (F, T, F ). After we apply all fault
scenarios, we can cover all eight possibilities eventually.
Moreover, our trace-based iterative generation strategy only generates new fault
scenarios on a newly captured stack trace. Suppose we apply fault conﬁguration
(T, F ) generated in Figure 6.4(b), we can capture the runtime trace τ1 → τ2 → τ4.
As shown in Figure 6.4(c), we only generate one new fault conﬁguration (T, F, F )
from the captured target function execution trace (T, F, T ). Here, we do not
generate a fault conﬁguration (T, T ) because it has been covered. In this way, no
duplicate fault scenarios (conﬁgurations) are generated.
Algorithm 9 illustrates how to generate new fault scenarios using the trace-
based iterative generation strategy. The algorithm takes a runtime trace ε, a ref-
erence fault scenario σ and the fault scenario database Σ as inputs. If the length
of the conﬁguration is less than the length of ε, the algorithm ﬁrst supplements
the conﬁguration by adding (j − i) true decisions into φ to build a complete con-
ﬁguration (line 2). The algorithm goes through subsequences of the runtime trace
ε between εj and εi. For each subsequence εi, the algorithm constructs a new fault
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Figure 6.4: Trace-based Iterative Generation Example
Algorithm 9 Iterative Generation (ε, σ, Σ)
1: i ← ε.size(); j ← σ.size(); φ ← ∅;
2: φ ← buildCompleteConfiguration(σ.φ, i, j);
3: while i > j do
4: φnew ← φj, 0; //Build a new conﬁguration
5: Σ.insert(〈εj+1, φnew〉); //Save the fault scenario
6: j ← j + 1;
7: end while
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decision φnew by combining the subsequence φi−1 of the previous fault decision φ
and a false decision. A new fault scenario is created which includes εi and φnew
and saved into the database Σ. Suppose we apply a fault conﬁguration φ  (T, F )
and capture the corresponding runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 → τ4, the corresponding
length i is 3 and j is 2. We ﬁrst supplement the conﬁguration as φ  (T, F, T ),
then we build a new conﬁguration φ  (T, F, F ).
6.2.4 Bounded Generation Strategy
We have applied the trace-based iterative generation strategy to device drivers and
it can greatly reduce the number of generated tests. However, there are still a large
number of fault scenarios generated. After analyzing the captured runtime trace,
we found that there are two main reasons.
1)Duplicate stack traces. For some drivers, many duplicate stack traces
exist in a runtime trace. There are mainly two reasons for duplicate stack traces.
First, the same target function is repeatedly invoked within a loop. For example,
a set of ring buﬀers is usually allocated using a loop when a network driver is
initialized. Second, the same target function is invoked along a driver path and
the driver path is frequently executed for processing special requests. For example,
system resources are allocated and freed in the transmit function for a network
driver and the transmit function is called many times during an instance of driver
testing.
2)Fault scenario explosion. Although we have applied the trace-based
iterative generation strategy to eliminate invalid fault scenarios, fault scenario
explosion still exists. As shown in Figure 6.4(a), eight fault scenarios can be all
valid for some drivers. If there are N target functions along a runtime trace, a
subset of all N target functions (the number is M , M < N) can still bring a large
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amount of fault scenarios (the number can be 2M − 1) in the ﬁnal result.
To solve these two problems, we have developed a bounded generation strategy
to avoid injecting an exponential number of fault scenarios. ADFI supports two
kinds of bounds: maximum number of injected faults on the same stack traces in
a fault scenario (MSF ) and maximum number of injected faults in a fault scenario
(MF ).
First we explain how MSF works. Suppose MSF is 1, we use an example
to illustrate the idea. We captured a runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 → τ3 and the
corresponding target function execution trace (F, T, T ). Within ε, τ1 and τ3 are the
same stack traces. If we generate fault scenarios following the trace-based iterative
strategy, we should generate two fault conﬁgurations (F, F ) and (F, T, F ). The
bounded generation strategy does not allow us to inject more than one fault on
the same stack trace, which means we only generate one fault conﬁguration (F, F ).
For another bound MF, the idea is straightforward. The number of injected faults
in a fault scenario cannot exceed MF.
As shown in Algorithm 10, we have extended Algorithm 9 to support bounded
generation. There are mainly three diﬀerences. First, we go through the reference
fault scenario σ to record all fault-related stack traces and the number of faults as
a map T before generating tests. Second, before fault scenarios are generated, we
check whether the number of faults in the reference fault scenario exceeds MF. If
yes, we terminate test generation and return directly. Third, during the generation,
we check whether the number of faults injected on the same stack traces exceeds
MSF. If not, we generate the corresponding fault scenario. Otherwise, no fault
scenario is generated.
As shown in Algorithm 11, we process the fault scenario σ to record all fault-
related stack traces. T  {〈τ, count〉 — τ is a stack trace, count is the number of
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Algorithm 10 Bounded Generation (ε, σ, Σ, bound)
1: i ← ε.size(); j ← σ.size(); φ ← ∅; T ← ∅
2: φ ← buildCompleteConfiguration(σ.φ, i, j);
3: T ← recordAllFaults(σ);
4: if checkMFBound(T, MF ) then
5: return
6: end if
7: while i > j do
8: if checkMSFBound(T, ε.τj+1, MSF ) then
9: φnew ← φj, 0; //Build a new conﬁguration
10: Σ.insert(〈εj+1, φnew〉); //Save the fault scenario
11: end if
12: j ← j + 1;
13: end while
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Algorithm 11 recordAllFaults (σ)
1: ε ← σ.ε; φ ← σ.φ; T ← ∅; i ← σ.size(); j ← 1;
2: while i ≥ j do
3: if φ.ϕj == F then
4: if T.find(ε.τj) == T.end() then
5: T.insert(ε.τj, 1);
6: else
7: T.find(ε.τj) ← T.find(ε.τj) + 1;
8: end if
9: end if
10: j ← j + 1;
11: end while
12: return T ;
faults injected on τ} is a map. We process each boolean variable φ.ϕj in the fault
conﬁguration. Once φ.ϕj is false, we insert 〈ε.τj, 1〉 into T or increase the count
by 1 if ε.τj exists in T .
6.3 PERMUTATION-BASED INJECTION STRATEGY
Even if we issue the same test suite to device drivers, two runtime traces ε1 and
ε2 can be diﬀerent due to driver concurrency, runtime uncertainty, such as timing
issues, memory allocation status and network overload.
There are three kinds of possible diﬀerences between ε1 and ε2 triggered by the
same test suite.
1)Diﬀerent sequences of stack traces. Device drivers are system software
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which can handle more than one requests at the same time, which means concur-
rency widely exists in device drivers. Due to the concurrency, even if two captured
runtime traces include the same stack traces, the sequence of stack traces can be
diﬀerent between ε1 and ε2.
2)Diﬀerent length of runtime traces. Due to diﬀerent system situations
or environments, the number of the same stack trace τ can be diﬀerent between
ε1 and ε2. For example, if we send the same data over a network driver, there can
be diﬀerent number of calls to the transmit function of the driver. This diﬀerence
brings diﬀerent number of the same τ existing in ε1 and ε2.
3)Diﬀerent number of unique stack traces. Due to diﬀerent faults inject-
ed, stack traces captured can be diﬀerent between ε1 and ε2. Since fault scenarios
trigger diﬀerent driver paths, ε1 and ε2 along diﬀerent paths can include diﬀerent
stack traces.
Since a fault scenario σ is generated based on a runtime trace, there are the
same diﬀerences between σ.ε and the corresponding triggered runtime trace εnew.
This makes it diﬃcult to guide runtime fault scenario injection.
We ﬁrst illustrate how to resolve the ﬁrst diﬀerence. A fault scenario σ includes
a runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 → ... → τn and a fault conﬁguration φ  ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕn.
To guide fault injection at runtime, it might trigger a new runtime trace εnew 
τnew1 → τnew2 → ... → τnewn . Here we assume that ε and εnew have the same stack
traces, later we will illustrate how to handle diﬀerent stack traces. ε should be
a permutation of εnew, which means εnew is constructed by all stack traces in ε
with a diﬀerent sequence. As an example, τ1 → τ2 → τ4 → τ3 is a permutation of
τ1 → τ2 → τ3 → τ4. In the runtime fault injection, we detect such permutations
automatically and guide the fault injection.
The second diﬀerence is caused by runtime uncertainty. Here we assume that
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ε and εnew include the same set of unique stack traces and the lengths of ε and
εnew can be diﬀerent, later we will discuss how to handle diﬀerent set of unique
stack traces. Based on the analysis of driver code and our observation, repeatedly
injecting faults on the same stack traces caused by runtime uncertainty does not
trigger new bugs. Therefore we just ignore such kinds of diﬀerences.
Algorithm 12 Get Fault Configuration (τ , σ, Flags)
1: i ← 0; n ← Flags.size();
2: i ← findNextStackTrace(τ, σ, i);
3: while i = n do
4: if Flags[i] = true then
5: Flags[i] ← true;
6: return σ.φ.ϕi;
7: end if
8: i ← findNextStackTrace(τ, σ, i);
9: end while
10: return true;
As shown in Algorithm 12, a permutation-based injection mechanism is devel-
oped to guide the fault conﬁguration. The algorithm takes a stack trace τ , the
fault scenario σ and a ﬂag array Flags as inputs. The array Flags has the length
of σ.ε and each element is initialized as false at the beginning of an instance of
fault injection. Each time a target function is invoked, we determine whether the
function should be executed normally or return an error with the corresponding
stack trace τ . We ﬁrst ﬁnd τ from the beginning of σ and return the index i. Then
we check Flags[i] to see whether the fault decision σ.φ.ϕi has been conducted or
not. If it is not conducted, we return σ.φ.ϕi. Otherwise, we continue to get the
index of the next stack trace from the position i. If we can not get the index from a
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position, findNextStackTrace function returns n which means all fault decisions
for τ have been covered. Therefore we return true to let the target function execute
normally.
The third diﬀerence is caused by diﬀerent faults injected. A set of unique stack
traces in ε and εnew is represented as Sε and Sεnew . There can be three kinds of
cases: Sε  Sεnew , Sεnew  Sε and (Sε  Sεnew and Sεnew  Sε). According to our
experiments, only the ﬁrst case Sε  Sεnew occurs. There are two reasons. First,
the same test suite is used for diﬀerent rounds of fault injections. Second, a fault
injected can trigger some new stack traces. Currently we also detect two other
kinds of cases in our tool. Once any case is found, a warning is given.
6.4 IMPLEMENTATION
6.4.1 Overview
As illustrated in Figure 6.5, our automatic fault injection framework includes three
key components:
Driver
Under Test
Trace
Recorder
Kernel
APIs
Test Suite Trace File
Fault
Scenarios
Fault Scenario
Generator
OS Kernel
Runtime
Controller
Figure 6.5: Runtime Fault Injection Framework
1)Trace Recorder. The trace recorder captures runtime traces and kernel
function return values while the driver is tested under a test suite. The trace
recorder fully hooks the kernel API function calls so that all function calls and
return values are intercepted and recorded in the trace ﬁles.
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2)Fault Scenario Generator. The fault scenario generator takes a trace
ﬁle as the input to generate fault scenarios. A trace-based iterative generation
algorithm is implemented and employed by the generator to deliver high-quality
fault scenarios. Generated fault scenarios are saved in the fault scenario database
for guiding further fault injection.
3)Runtime Controller. The runtime controller applies a fault scenario in
the driver testing process by emulating a fault return according to the fault con-
ﬁguration. The runtime controller is a kernel-level module working with the trace
recorder together. It intercepts all target function calls invoked by device drivers.
Once a kernel API function call is captured, it determines if a fault should be
injected. If it is, the runtime controller returns a false result instead of invoking
the real kernel API function.
6.4.2 Fault Injection on Kernel API Interface
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on the kernel API functions provided by the
kernel since we want to test whether device drivers can survive under diﬀerent
system situations. Since operating systems provide lots of kernel API functions to
support drivers, so far we have conducted our research on three main categories of
kernel API functions:
1)Memory Allocation Functions. The Linux kernel oﬀers a rich set of
memory allocation primitives which can be used by device drivers to allocate and
optimize system memory resources. Diﬀerent kinds of memory allocation func-
tions can be used for allocating diﬀerent kinds of memory. For example, the
“kmalloc” function is used to grab small pieces of memory in kernel space and
“get free page(s)” function is used to allocate larger contiguous blocks of memory.
2)Memory Map and DMA Functions. A modern operating system is
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usually a virtual memory system, which means that the addresses seen by user
programs do not directly correspond to the physical address used by the hardware
devices. Memory map functions are needed for the conversion between virtual
address and physical address. For example, the “mmap” function establishes a
mapping between a process address space and a device. DMA is the hardware
mechanism used for data transfer between device drivers and hardware devices
without the need of involving the system processor. For example, the the “d-
ma set mask” function is used for checking if the mask is possible and updates the
device parameters if it is.
3)PCI Interface Functions. PCI bus is a widely-used system bus for at-
taching hardware devices. To support PCI device control and management, a set
of functions are provided by the kernel and used by device drivers. For example,
the “pci enable device” function is used for initializing device before it is used by
a driver.
6.4.3 Filter Mechanism
When we ﬁrst applied ADFI, we observed that the same crashes happened repeat-
edly. After analyzing these crashes, we found two key reasons.
1)Caused by a target function. If a fault is injected into a target function
f˜ , the corresponding error handling code for f˜ is tested. If the error handling
mechanism is not correct, there is always a crash if a fault is injected on f˜ in a
fault scenario.
2)Caused by a sequence of stack traces. Suppose a fault scenario σ1
includes a runtime trace ε  τ1 → τ2 → τ3 → τ4 and a fault conﬁguration
φ  T, F, T, F , it triggers a crash. If another fault scenario σ2 includes the same
runtime trace and a diﬀerent fault conﬁguration φ  F, F, T, F , σ2 possibly causes
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the same crash. In σ1, two faults are injected in τ2 and τ4 which cause a crash.
Since the same two faults are injected in τ2 and τ4 within σ2, the same crash usually
happens according to our experiments.
The target function f˜ is included in diﬀerent stack traces. The stack trace τ
is included in diﬀerent fault scenarios. If we detect a bug triggered by a speciﬁc
target function or a stack trace or a sequence of stack traces, we do not want to
trigger the same crash repeatedly by other fault scenarios. Currently we provide
two kinds of ﬁlter mechanisms to avoid such kinds of repeated crashes.
1)Function-Call-based Filter. A function call can be labeled as a ﬁlter
pattern. As long as a fault needs to be injected into this function call according
to the fault conﬁguration, the fault scenario is ignored and not applied.
2)Stack-Trace-based Filter. A stack trace (or a sequence of stack traces)
can be deﬁned as a ﬁlter pattern. As long as a fault (or a sequence of faults)
needs to be injected into a stack trace (or a sequence of stack traces, respectively)
according to the fault conﬁguration, the fault scenario is ignored and not applied.
The ﬁlter mechanism provides ﬂexibility for driver developers to deﬁne ﬁlters
to avoid repeated crashes. It has been applied to both fault scenario generation
and injection.
6.5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.5.1 Experimental Setup
As shown in Table 6.1, we applied ADFI to 12 drivers in 3 categories: Wireless,
USB controller and Ethernet. These three categories represent the most important
three types of PCI devices.
As the workloads of the experiments, we created diﬀerent test suites for diﬀerent
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Table 6.1: Summary of Target Drivers
Category Driver Size Description
Wireless
ath9k 4.3M Qualcomm AR9485 Wireless Driver
iwlwiﬁ 12M Intel Wireless AGN Driver
USB
ehci hcd 10M USB 2.0 Host Controller Driver
xhci hcd 13M USB 3.0 Host Controller Driver
Ethernet
e100 655K Intel(R) PRO/100 Network Driver
e1000 2.3M Intel(R) PRO/1000 Network Driver
ixgbe 5.9M Intel(R) 10 Gigabit Network Driver
i40e 8M Intel(R) 40 Gigabit Network Driver
tg3 2.1M Broadcom Tigon3 Ethernet Driver
bnx2 1.3M Broadcom NetXtreme II Driver
8139cp 537K RealTek Fast Ethernet driver
r8169 1.1M RealTek Gigabit Ethernet Driver
categories. There is one requirement that each test suite must start with a “load
driver” command and end with a “remove driver” command. Between them, any
test cases are allowed. A partial list of test cases for each category is shown in
Table 6.2. Of these drivers, Intel ethernet network drivers are downloaded1. The
other drivers are from Linux kernel source code.
6.5.2 Bug Findings
After testing all 12 drivers, we found the 28 distinct bugs described in Table 6.3.
Of these bugs, 8 bugs are triggered by PCI interface faults, 8 bugs are triggered
by memory allocation faults, 8 bugs are triggered by DMA function faults, and
the other 4 bugs are triggered by mixed PCI/Memory/DMA faults. All these bugs
can result in serious driver/system issues which include driver freeze, driver crash,
1The latest version of Intel ethernet network drivers can be download in the following link:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/e1000/files/
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Table 6.2: Summary of Workload
Category Test Applications
Wireless
Basic network commands (e.g. ifup, ifconﬁg, ifdown)
Data transfer commands (e.g. scp, ping)
Wireless conﬁg tools (e.g. iw, iwconﬁg)
USB
Basic USB control commands (e.g. lsusb)
Enable/disable a USB device on the USB hub
Transfer data to a USB disk
Ethernet
Basic network commands (e.g. ifup, ifconﬁg, ifdown)
Data transfer commands (e.g. scp, ping)
Ethernet conﬁg tools (e.g. ethtool, scapy)
Table 6.3: Bug Results
Category
Wireless Driver USB Driver Ethernet Driver
Total
ath9k iwlwiﬁ ehci hcd xhci hcd e100 e1000 ixgbe i40e tg3 bnx2 8139cp r8169
PCI 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 8
Memory 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 8
DMA 1 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8
Mixed 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Total 1 1 0 4 2 8 2 4 0 3 3 0 28
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system freeze and system crash. Moreover, all these bugs are diﬃcult to ﬁnd under
normal situations.
These results show the eﬀectiveness of our fault injection approach. We sum-
marize the failure outcomes as follows:
1)System crash. The fault results in a kernel panic or fatal system error
which crashes the entire system.
2)System hang. The fault results in a kernel freeze where the whole system
ceases to respond to inputs.
3)Driver crash. The fault only results in a driver crash while the system can
still work correctly.
4)Driver freeze. The fault only results in a driver freeze where the driver
can not be loaded/removed.
21.43%
10.71%
53.57%
14.29%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
System crash System hang Driver crash Driver freeze
Figure 6.6: Outcomes of Experiments
Figure 6.6 provides the distributions of failure types. Of the 28 bugs, 9 bugs
result in system failures including 6 system crashes and 3 system hangs. The other
19 bugs result in driver failures including 15 driver crashes and 4 driver freezes.
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Bug Validation. To verify if all these bugs are valid, we manually injected bug-
correlated faults into device drivers. For example, if there is a “kmalloc” fault, we
manually injected the fault. We modiﬁed the original statement
“void * p = kmalloc(size, GFP KERNEL);”
to
“void * p = NULL;”
Then we recompiled the driver and ran the driver under the test suite. The above
example is just a simple fault scenario. Some fault scenarios are quite involved and
require more modiﬁcations to the driver code to reproduce. All 28 bugs can be
triggered the same way as they are triggered by ADFI. By this manual validation,
we are better assured that all 28 bugs are valid and they can happen in a real
system environment.
6.5.3 Human Eﬀorts
One goal of ADFI is to minimize the human eﬀort in testing the robustness of
a driver. The necessary eﬀort of our approach comes from three sources: (1)
a conﬁguration ﬁle to prepare ADFI for testing a driver; (2) crash analysis; (3)
compilation ﬂag modiﬁcation to support coverage. The ﬁrst two eﬀorts are required
for our approach while the third one is optional.
Conﬁguration ﬁle. Only a few parameters need to be deﬁned in a conﬁguration
ﬁle. They include driver name, runtime data folder path, test suite path and several
runtime parameters. One example is shown in Figure 6.7. Such conﬁguration is
easy to create. In our experiments, only a few minutes are needed to set up one
conﬁguration ﬁle.
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Table 6.4: Results under Diﬀerent MF (MSF = 1)
Category MF
Wireless Driver USB Driver Ethernet Driver
ath9k iwlwiﬁ ehci hcd xhci hcd e100 e1000 ixgbe i40e tg3 bnx2 8139cp r8169
PCI
1 1 3 0 0 2 5 5 5 7 3 2 2
2 1 3 0 0 2 9 8 8 10 3 2 3
3 1 3 0 0 2 9 9 8 10 3 2 3
Memory
1 5 24 4 1 3 13 11 32 11 9 1 3
2 5 164 10 1 3 49 53 136 25 34 1 3
3 5 840 12 1 3 117 156 414 29 51 1 3
DMA
1 3 4 1 6 5 11 9 17 4 13 3 8
2 3 9 1 6 6 40 51 69 6 77 7 24
3 3 10 1 6 6 95 171 177 6 221 8 37
ALL
1 9 31 5 7 10 28 25 54 22 25 6 13
2 9 235 15 7 12 180 209 268 84 234 10 56
3 9 1375 18 7 12 858 924 1365 175 980 11 130
Figure 6.7: A Sample Conﬁguration
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Crash analysis. Once a crash happens, the developer needs to ﬁgure out the
cause of the crash. Our approach can inject the same fault and trigger the same
behavior repeatedly. When there is a crash, our approach can tell what faults have
been injected into the driver. Furthermore, the whole driver stack is provided
by ADFI to support crash analysis. This information can help driver developers
understand and ﬁgure out the root cause of the crash. In our experiments, the
average time for understanding each of the 28 bugs is less than 10 minutes using
the ADFI debug facilities.
Compilation ﬂag. In order to evaluate the driver code coverage, we need to
compile the driver with additional compilation ﬂags. We can achieve this in two
ways. First, we can add the ﬂags into the Linux kernel compilation process. Sec-
ond, we can add the ﬂags into the driver compilation Makeﬁle. Both ways are easy
to implement. In our experiments, we manually added the compilation ﬂags into
each driver Makeﬁle.
6.5.4 Evaluation of Fault Generation and Injection Strategy
ADFI allows two kinds of bounds, the maximum faults (MF) and the maximum
same faults (MSF) in a test case. We ﬁrst set MSF as 1 and then generated faults
under diﬀerent MFs. Table 6.4 shows the number of generated fault scenarios
where MF is 1, 2 and 3.
We have generated fault scenarios on all functions in the three categories (c.f.
Section 5.2). As shown in Table 6.4, diﬀerent number of fault scenarios were
generated for diﬀerent device drivers. For drivers such as ath9k and 8139cp, only
about 10 fault scenarios were generated. For drivers such as iwlwiﬁ and i40e, more
than 1000 fault scenarios were generated. The number of generated faults depends
on how many target functions are used in a device driver.
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Figure 6.8: Time Usage
Another observation from the results is that there are no generated fault sce-
narios for ehci hcd and xhci hcd under PCI category. After analyzing the source
code of ehci hcd and xhci hcd code, we did not ﬁnd PCI-related functions invoked
by these drivers directly. The fact is that both these drivers only invoke some
PCI wrapper functions directly and these PCI wrapper functions are deﬁned in
the kernel.
We further tried to generate fault scenarios while setting MSF as 2 on e1000
and iwlwiﬁ drivers. We generated more test cases on both drivers, however no new
bugs were detected and almost no coverage improvement was achieved.
In order to evaluate the eﬃciency of ADFI, we summarized total time usage for
fault generation and injection in Figure 6.8. All these time usages were summarized
while generating fault scenarios on all functions in three categories. ADFI can
deliver high quality fault scenarios and ﬁnd bugs eﬀectively with a modest amount
of time.
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Table 6.5: Summary of Coverage Improvement
Driver
Statement Branch
#
Test Suite Generated Tests
#
Test Suite Generated Tests
# % # % # % # %
ath9k 6146 3147 51.20% 3208 52.20% 3171 1059 33.40% 1268 39.99%
iwlwiﬁ 11966 6761 56.50% 7000 58.50% 6458 2454 38.00% 2648 41.00%
ehci hcd 2763 1307 47.30% 1323 47.88% 1586 568 35.81% 588 37.07%
xhci hcd 4772 2114 44.30% 2119 44.40% 2485 721 29.01% 723 29.09%
e100 1258 721 57.31% 743 59.06% 617 206 33.39% 231 37.44%
e1000 5496 2215 40.30% 2259 41.10% 3530 787 22.29% 833 23.60%
ixgbe 13234 4222 31.90% 4301 32.50% 7288 1414 19.40% 1479 20.29%
i40e 9666 3557 36.80% 3886 40.20% 4882 1089 22.31% 1255 25.71%
tg3 7865 2580 32.80% 2658 33.80% 4990 983 19.70% 1043 20.90%
bnx2 3856 1828 47.41% 1859 48.21% 2217 643 29.00% 687 30.99%
8139cp 856 498 58.18% 506 59.11% 314 117 37.26% 126 40.13%
r8169 2596 1241 47.80% 1264 48.69% 848 294 34.67% 319 37.62%
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6.5.5 Coverage Improvement
As shown in Table 6.5, the generated fault scenarios led to decent test coverage
improvement. Our approach focuses on the error handling mechanism and capa-
bility of device drivers. The error handling code only takes up a small portion of
driver code. Even if we can trigger all error handling mechanisms in a driver, it
does not mean that the improved coverage is very high.
As shown in Table 6.5, the improved coverage is from 0.1% to 6.5%. However,
our approach can cover a lot of error handling branches. Particularly, for iwlwiﬁ
and i40e, the statement coverage can be improved by more than 200 new state-
ments and the branch coverage can be improved by more than 150 new branches.
After going through all 150 new branches, we found that most of them are error
handling branches.
6.5.6 Evaluation against Other Fault Injection Techniques
We have evaluated other fault injection techniques. Their comparison with our
approach can be founded in Section 6.6.3.
6.5.7 Further Potentials
Although our approach is only evaluated on Linux device drivers in our experi-
ments, the idea can be applied in other domains. We list three potential applica-
tions in the following:
1)Linux kernel module testing. While ADFI mainly focuses on device
drivers, the principles can easily apply to other kernel modules. The only eﬀort is
to identify necessary categories of target functions for diﬀerent kernel modules.
2)Windows driver testing. The Windows drivers have similar structures
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to Linux drivers. Once we can ﬁgure out how to migrate ADFI into the Windows
environment, it can be used for Windows driver robustness testing.
3)User-level program/library testing. The user-level program/library
needs to invoke certain functions which can fail at runtime, for example “mal-
loc” function. Our idea can be further applied to test the robustness of user-level
program/library to improve reliability.
6.6 RELATED WORK
There has been much research on device driver testing since drivers account for
a major portion of operating systems and are a major cause of operating system
crashes [28]. Our work is related to past work in several areas, including static
analysis, reliability testing and fault injection.
6.6.1 Static Analysis
Model checking, theorem proving, and program analysis have been used to analyze
device drivers to ﬁnd thousands of bugs [7, 26, 42, 64]. Nevertheless, these tools
take time to run and the results require time and expertise to interpret. Thus, these
tools are not well suited to the frequent modiﬁcations and tests that are typical of
initial code development. Numerous approaches have proposed to statically infer
so-called protocols, describing expected sequences of function calls [26, 42, 66].
These approaches have focused on sequences of function calls that are expected
to appear within a single function, rather than the speciﬁc interaction between a
driver and the rest of the kernel.
Some safety holes in drivers can be eliminated by the use of advanced type
systems. For example, Bugrara and Aiken propose an analysis to diﬀerentiate be-
tween safe and unsafe userspace pointers in kernel code [15]. They focus, however,
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on the entire kernel, and thus may report to the driver developer about faults in
code other than his own.
6.6.2 Reliability Testing
There has been much research for operating systems reliability testing [4, 14, 21, 25,
37, 68, 69, 71]. Reliability testing of operating systems has been focused on device
drivers since drivers are usually developed by a third party. Previous research
on device driver reliability has mainly targeted detecting, isolating, and avoiding
generic programming errors and errors in the interface between the driver and the
OS.
6.6.3 Fault Injection Techniques
In software testing, fault injection is a technique for improving the coverage of a test
by introducing faults to test code paths, in particular error handling code paths,
that might otherwise rarely be followed. Fault injection techniques are widely
used for software and system testing [29, 54, 55, 56, 61], ranging from testing the
reliability of device drivers to testing operating systems, embedded systems and
real-time systems [5, 16, 35, 36, 46, 58, 67].
There are several fault injection frameworks provided on both Windows and
Linux platforms.
Windows Driver Veriﬁer: Driver Veriﬁer provides options to fail instances
of the driver’s memory allocations, as might occur if the driver was running on
a computer with insuﬃcient memory. This tests the driver’s ability to respond
properly to low memory and other low-resource conditions.
Linux Fault Injection Framework: This framework [23] can cause memory
allocation failures at two levels: in the slab allocator (where it aﬀects kmalloc
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and most other small-object allocations) and at the page allocator level (where it
aﬀects everything, eventually). There are also hooks to cause occasional disk I/O
operations to fail, which should be useful for ﬁlesystem developers. In both cases,
there is a ﬂexible runtime conﬁguration infrastructure, based on debugfs, which
will let developers focus fault injections into a speciﬁc part of the kernel.
KEDR Framework: KEDR [67] is a framework for dynamic (runtime and post
mortem) analysis of Linux kernel modules, including device drivers, ﬁle system
modules, etc. The components of KEDR operate on a kernel module chosen by
the user. They can intercept the function calls made by the module and, based
on that, detect memory leaks, simulate resource shortage in the system as well
as other uncommon situations, save the information about the function calls to a
kind of “trace” for future analysis by the user-space tools.
There are three major limitations in the frameworks above. First, these frameworks
mainly support memory-related fault injection to simulate low resource situation-
s. Second, these frameworks mainly provide random fault simulation. Third,
these frameworks require high manual eﬀorts. Our approach extends the above
framework to support more fault situations, such as DMA-related operations and
PCI-related operations. Our approach provides an easy-to-use approach with little
human eﬀort which can systematically enumerate diﬀerent kinds of fault scenarios
to guide fault simulation.
6.7 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented an approach to runtime fault injection for driver
robustness testing. We have evaluated our approach on 12 widely-used device
drivers. Our approach was able to generate and inject eﬀective fault scenarios in
a modest amount of time using the trace-based iterative fault generation strategy.
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We have detected 28 bugs which have been further validated by manually injecting
these bugs into device drivers. We have also measured test coverage and found that
ADFI led to decent improvement in statement and branch coverage in drivers.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 CONCLUSION
Post-silicon validation has become a critical problem in the product development
cycle, driven by increasing design complexity, higher level of integration and de-
creasing time-to-market. According to recent industry reports, validation accounts
for a large portion of overall product cost. Post-silicon validation consumes an
increasing share of the overall product development time [75]. This demands in-
novative approaches to speeding up post-silicon validation and reducing its cost.
To accelerate post-silicon validation, this dissertation research has successfully
developed several approaches and tools to shift-left post-silicon validation with
virtual prototypes.
Coverage Analysis of Post-silicon Tests. Post-silicon validation tests should
be well evaluated before they are issued to a silicon device. We have developed
an approach to early coverage evaluation of post-silicon validation tests with vir-
tual prototypes, which fully leverages the observability and traceability of virtual
prototypes.
The approach utilizes virtual prototype coverage to estimate silicon device func-
tional coverage. Two kinds of coverage metrics have been employed to the evalu-
ation process. Typical software coverage metrics have been adopted to give basic
coverage indication. Two hardware-speciﬁc coverage metrics, register coverage
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and transaction coverage, have been developed to deliver more accurate hardware-
oriented coverage results.
The approach has been used for evaluating a suite of common tests on virtu-
al prototypes of ﬁve network adapters. High conﬁdence has been established in
ﬁdelity of coverage evaluation by further conducting coverage evaluation and con-
formance checking on silicon devices. With this early coverage estimation, it can
guide further test generation.
Automatic Concolic Test Generation. High-quality tests should be ready be-
fore a silicon device becomes available [57] in order to save time spent on preparing,
debugging and ﬁxing tests in the post-silicon stage after the device is available.
We have presented an automatic concolic approach to generation of post-silicon
tests with virtual prototypes.
The approach takes advantage of white box nature of virtual prototypes and
applies “concolic” idea from software testing to hardware domain. We have eval-
uated our approach on virtual devices for three popular network adapters. Our
ACTG approach was able to generate eﬀective test cases in a modest amount of
time using the transaction-based test selection strategy. We have evaluated this
strategy from two aspects: state selection eﬃciency and redundancy identiﬁcation.
The results show that our strategy performs signiﬁcantly better than random se-
lection of states under test and has signiﬁcant reduction on the number of tests
that have to be applied within limited amount of time.
We have measured test coverage and found that ACTG led to major improve-
ment in coverage of device functionalities. Moreover, we applied generated test
cases to both virtual and silicon devices and conducted consistency checking be-
tween their states. We have detect 20 inconsistencies between virtual and silicon
devices, each of which reveals a defect in either the virtual or silicon device.
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Eﬀective Fault Injection for Driver Robustness Testing. Besides the cov-
erage evaluation and test generation for hardware validation, we have further ex-
plored how to support software validation with virtual prototypes. Since virtual
prototypes enable early driver testing, we have developed an automatic fault in-
jection approach for driver robustness testing.
The approach can be used on both virtual platform and physical platform.
We have evaluated our approach on 12 widely-used device drivers. Our approach
was able to generate and inject eﬀective fault scenarios in a modest amount of
time using the iterative trace-based fault generation strategy. We have detected
28 bugs which have been further validated by manually injecting these bugs into
device drivers. We have also measured test coverage and found that ADFI led to
decent improvement in statement and branch coverage over error handling code in
drivers.
7.2 FUTURE RESEARCH
The dissertation has presented several approaches to accelerate post-silicon func-
tional validation with virtual prototypes. Moreover, virtual prototypes can enable
more interesting research which should be explored.
7.2.1 Conformance Checking between Virtual Prototype and Hard-
ware Design
Virtual prototype and the corresponding hardware design are developed according
to the same speciﬁcation. At the transaction level, they should behave the same
and provide the same functionalities. However, there are some diﬀerences because
they are developed separately by diﬀerent software developers and hardware engi-
neers.
118
Virtual Prototype
Path Constraints
Hardware Design
Symbolic Execution
of Virtual Prototype
Symbolic Execution
of Hardware Design
Output1
Output2
Conform? Yes/No/Unsure
Figure 7.1: Framework for Conformance Checking between Virtual Prototype and
Hardware Design
We employ symbolic execution to conduct conformance checking between a vir-
tual prototype and the corresponding hardware design. As shown in Figure 7.1,
the framework mainly includes two symbolic execution engines for virtual proto-
types and hardware designs. In this dissertation, we have proposed a symbolic
execution engine for virtual prototypes. Moreover, we have already developed a
symbolic execution engine for hardware designs which mainly target at RTL design
symbolic execution.
Using this framework, we ﬁrst execute the virtual prototype with symbolic in-
puts using symbolic execution. For each path covered in the symbolic execution of
the virtual prototype, we collect path constraints and output1. With the collected
path constraints, we execute the hardware design and collect output2. Then the
conformance is checked between output1 and output2.
But there are still several challenges. First, we need to ﬁgure out how to map a
transaction in the virtual prototype to a sequential state transitions in the hardware
design. Second, we need to solve state exploration problem in symbolic execution
of virtual prototypes. Third, we need to implement a suﬃcient mechanism to check
the conformance between output1 and output2.
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7.2.2 Automatic Test Generation for RTL Simulation/Emulation with
Virtual Prototypes
The automatic test generator will be extended to generate tests that can be fed
into simulators and emulators. Since the designs are often simulated/emulated
stand-alone, test harnesses have to be provided to feed the tests into the designs.
Therefore, our test generator may have to generate such test harnesses or at least
generate tests in formats that can be consumed by these harnesses.
Test Manger
Operating System
Virtual Machine
Test Suite
Recorder
Virtual 
Prototype
Execution Harness
Symbolic Engine
Virtual 
Prototype
Simulator/ Emulator
Hardware 
Design
Generated 
Test Cases
Request 
Sequence
Figure 7.2: Workﬂow of Automatic Test Generation for RTL Simulation
As shown in Figure 7.2, our test generation algorithm will still be based on
the execution of the virtual device in a virtual machine and its interaction with
its software driver. Using this approach, the tests generated reﬂect how the soft-
ware utilizes the driver. In addition, the algorithm will be guided by the coverage
analysis so that both the coverage information on the virtual device and that on
the hardware design will be utilized. After generating test cases, our approach
can then apply a generated test case to hardware design simulation/emulation.
Our automatic test generation framework includes three key components: (1) The
recorder captures device requests from a concrete execution of the virtual device
in the virtual machine and records them in the request sequence; (2) The symbol-
ic engine replays the captured request sequence and generate eﬃcient test cases
based on generation strategy; (3) The test manager is an individual module which
communicates with simulator/emulator to apply a test case to a hardware design.
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7.2.3 Further Research on Device Fault Injection with Virtual Proto-
types for Driver Testing
To ensure the system reliability, device drivers must tolerate hardware-related
faults, such as DMA failures, interrupt loss, device I/O errors. Therefore, it is
necessary that diﬀerent kinds of hardware faults can be generated and injected to
test the driver robustness.
As illustrated in Section 5.5, we have developed a framework for device fault
injection with virtual prototypes. The framework ﬁrst generates numerous fault
scenarios automatically based on the runtime trace from concrete execution of
device drivers and virtual prototypes. Generated fault scenarios can be used to
simulate runtime hardware faults to test whether device drivers can handle unex-
pected hardware faults correctly.
Currently there are only two fault models: I/O error model and Interrupt loss
model. However, there are more possible fault models like DMA error model and
Interrupt hang model. In the future, we need to add these fault models into our
fault injection framework.
We have conducted preliminary evaluation on three virtual prototypes and the
corresponding Linux drivers using our VPFI framework. We found 2 serious bugs
with generated fault scenarios. In the future work, we will continue implementing
VPFI framework and applying it to more virtual prototypes and the corresponding
drivers. We will work on fully developing this approach and conducting further
evaluation.
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